

**Formation, Development, and Identity of Collaborators under
Occupation: A case study of Japanese-occupied Koreans from 1910 to
1945**

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Abstract

This study intends to examine the creation, development, and identity of indigenous collaborators under foreign occupation. Specifically, this research will demonstrate how occupying force encourages collaboration for the efficient management of its ruling, how collaborators decide to engage with a non-national government, and how collaborators' identity develops in response to the stigma from fellow nationals. To this end, this study will focus on the case of Japanese-occupied Koreans during the Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Historical and contemporary data on Korean collaborators and the Japanese occupation policies located in colonial archives and government and civic research institutes will be reviewed and interpreted. Multiple sources such as diaries, letters, published articles, and published memoirs will provide information on the identities of collaborators. Also, reputations and evaluations regarding collaborators will be collected in order to examine how average Koreans reacted towards collaborators. I will probe the processes of the creation of collaborators and their changing identities through sequence analysis and content analysis.

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When one political/military entity occupies another territory, collaboration arises between the occupiers and certain segments of the occupied population. Such occupations are possible primarily due to the essential aid of some groups of indigenous people who undertake the brokerage role between occupiers and the occupied. Examples include ancient societies under Roman and Chinese rule; colonized Africa, Asia, and Latin America; European countries under the Nazis; ethnic minorities under Chinese control; and Iraq under American occupation. Consequently, collaborators become a fundamental source of social/political mobilization, economic exploitation, and close surveillance of the subjected population. This leads to important questions: How do occupiers seek the creation and maintenance of the crucial support of the subjected population, and in turn, how do the subjected populations respond to occupiers' control?

Studies of occupation (especially in regard to colonialism) agree that territorial occupation involve more complicated mechanisms of control through collaboration than simple dyadic relations between occupiers and the occupied (Branch, 2007; Dallin, 1981; Doyle, 1986; Fieldhouse, 1981; Mommsen, 1986; Robinson, 1972, 1986; Wesseling, 1978). However, most research analyses of the formation of collaboration have focused on either a demand (i.e., occupiers) or supply (i.e., the occupied) side and overlooked the way in which both state-level structural factors and individual agents have interacted

in the formation of collaborative movements. Moreover, these analyses have conceptualized collaborators as fixed and unchanging entities without considering processes of identity negotiation vis-à-vis their nationality. Less common is research on collaboration dealing with non-European occupation (Kim, 2004; Switting & Vickers, 2007; Vickers et al., 2003) and the mysterious complexities of motives and cognition that collaborators bore (Brook, 2005; Caprio, 2007; Fu, 1993). However, these studies have neglected to explain the mechanisms through which collaboration has formed and developed, considering collaborators as isolated decision makers.

The current research aims to bring these issues of indigenous collaboration to the forefront in the case of Japanese-occupied Koreans. During the Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, Korean collaborators greatly influenced each stage of Japanese occupational organization, policy implementation, and information collection. For instance, these collaborators indoctrinated fellow Koreans with public notices to justify Japanese colonial rule, informed the Japanese of independent and anti-colonial movements, arrested and tortured Korean rebels, fought on the frontlines against their own countrymen, and exploited fellow Koreans to contribute to the prosperity of the Japanese empire.

This research broadly asks questions about who the collaborators are as well as why and how they decided to become collaborators. More specifically, it will introduce three key questions: 1) What strategies did the Japanese imperial state utilize in order to incorporate pro-Japanese collaborators into the colonial ruling? 2)

How did these collaborators make decisions and choices for collaboration? 3) How did collaborators' identities and loyalties shift in light of uncertain political circumstances of colonial ruling? To answer these questions, this research will first categorize collaborators into four ideal types—loyalists, brokers, conformists, and hostages—and then suggest three hypotheses:

1. The Japanese imperial state applied patterned strategies for producing systematic and massive collaboration in Korea through the mobilization of the elite class, the exploitation of social cleavages, unequal development plans, and metaphorical whips and carrots;
2. Collaborators' collective decision-making processes play a critical role in determining whether they cooperate with the Japanese although rational choices for collaboration and their habitus are the other important determinant factors; and
3. Collaborators' identities and loyalty towards the Japanese and Korean vacillated as they perceived signs of acceptance or rejection from their countrymen (i.e., stigma).

This project will first develop a general theory of collaboration in the context of pressure created by an occupying power. Although this is primarily an empirical study of Japanese occupation, my research will construct measures of collaboration and generate testable hypotheses for the real-world and complex processes of contemporary collaboration in occupied societies. Second, this research takes into account the intersection of macro and micro aspects of processes of collaboration. The developments of

collaborative factions necessarily involve not only external motivating forces, but also actors who actively negotiate their environments (Kim, 2004). Moreover, this process needs to be understood as an outcome of intricate micro social and political relations among specific groups within colonial society. Thus, the state should not be theorized as a homogenous and uniform entity (Adams et al., 2005; Harris, 1991; Steinmetz, 2007). Rather, the state is a composition of administrators, professionals, soldiers, etc.—each of whom harbors slightly different ambitions and prejudices. Third, this research gives insight into how stigma works in the configuration of the relations between occupiers, collaborators and the rest of occupied society, and consequently, reveals the way in which the social order in the occupied society operates without its own sovereignty. Faced with the overwhelming power and violence of occupiers, non-collaborators shared certain beliefs, behaviors, and values toward occupiers and collaborators who betrayed their nation, and further stigmatized them. In addition, collaborators maintained a sense of solidarity in which they felt the similarities among them. Although collaboration hampered national solidarity, it constituted the basis of interaction for the rest of society and fostered national identity as well as a sense of a community among non-collaborators.

Types of Collaborators

Defining who collaborators are has been a highly controversial issue in every occupied society. Collaborators are generally those who supported a foreign occupation by shifting their interest from loyalty to their own country to loyalty to occupiers, demonstrating behavior

that is at odds with national interests in the eyes of non-collaborators. Originally, the term *collaboration* was a neutral expression that implies an equal relationship between two parties for the purpose of common goals (Brook, 2005). However, it has also come to imply that one party breaks relations with former affiliations (Stanton, 2002). As such, most nationals and nationalist scholars consider collaborators as having a pejorative and negative connotation, such as condemnable puppets, traitors, treasonists, and betrayers. However, such understanding often induces ambiguity about the reality of collaboration as the declaration and accusation of collaborators continually changes depending on the political processes imposed by the state and the public. Moreover, such an understanding ignores actual and diverse circumstances that affected collaborators in the existence of pressure produced by foreign occupiers, simply passing moral judgment onto them (Brook, 2005; Caprio, 2007).

In fact, collaborators can come from every segment of occupied society at a disproportionate rate, including upper-to-low classes, age groups, various regions, and economic sectors. In a sense, all who lived under the occupation can be regarded as collaborators in that they might have cooperated with foreign occupiers to some degree in some way for whatever reasons. However, the reason why some are denounced as collaborators while others are not relates to the degree of involvement in occupiers' projects and the varying levels of cruelty toward the occupied nations. Moreover, some groups of people may have been forced to collaborate with occupiers and harm their countrymen against their will.

In order to avoid such pitfalls related to the definition of collaborators, this research will focus on collaborators' identities and loyalty behind their choice of collaboration.¹ Actors' national identity is always contested, depending on the social context in which individuals are embedded (Brubaker, 2009; Somers, 1994); loyalty is—accordingly—as well. The pressure that the occupied feel to be loyal to occupiers induces severe conflicts in national identity formerly created by social norms, values, and history in occupied society. In other words, all occupied populations experience contradictory and ambivalent feelings toward the occupying forces even if they have strong national consciousness under occupation. Consequently, the occupied populations may partially abandon their national identity by voluntarily or non-voluntarily adopting occupiers' language. A careful investigation of individuals' changing identity and loyalty processes will make it possible to analyze and interpret the conditions in which these individuals living under occupation made choices about collaboration.

¹ Although identity is more about a cognition of oneself, loyalty involves one's attitudes and behaviors toward others based on one's identity. Here, both identity and loyalty are used in a complementary way in order to delve into individuals' psychology.




Figure 1. Four types of collaborators based on identities and loyalty

In this vein, the current research suggests four categories of collaborators that correspond to the direction of their identity and loyalty, depending on the side they choose (i.e., occupiers or nation): (1) loyalists, (2) brokers, (3) conformists, and (4) hostages (see Figure 1). This categorization intends to provide an analytical tool for investigating collaborators who arise in different times and spaces without any moral evaluation or condemnation (e.g., Weber, 2002). Although this categorization may not reflect the concrete and precise reality of collaboration, it can serve as a logical basis for understanding patterns of collaboration by checking (dis)similarities with real cases. Moreover, by measuring identities and loyalty as a key component of collaborators, this typology allows for tracking how a certain type of collaborators turns into another type under occupation.

First, *loyalists*² demonstrate a high level of loyalty to occupiers, but a low level of loyalty to their nation. This group of collaborators tends to undertake activities voluntarily on behalf of occupiers and are willing to contribute to the prosperity of occupiers by abandoning their national identity to a considerable degree. Loyalists incorporate occupiers' customs, language, and norms into their own and try to be identical with or similar to occupiers. Their motives can be ideological or materialistic, meaning that they decide to become enthusiastic collaborators because they are purely inspired by occupiers' advanced culture, technology, and political system or because they are eager to maintain their power and wealth under occupation. Despite embracing foreign occupation, loyalists are highly reluctant to eschew the independence of their own country. Rather, they try to exploit and mobilize their nation in order to support occupiers and themselves. The reality of their countrymen, including difficult economic/political situations under occupation, does not concern them. Therefore, loyalists can be generally considered as national traitors according to their countrymen's perspectives.

Second, *brokers* have a high level of loyalty to both occupiers and their nation. Their reasons for collaboration may be similar to those of loyalists; however, unlike loyalists, brokers view occupiers as a means to benefit their own people. For instance, brokers might have admiration for occupiers' society, perceiving occupiers as their good neighbors. They have a hope that occupiers could provide guidance with the civilized culture over the project of incorporating their

² Originally, loyalists have loyalty to their nation, but in this project, I define them as those who have loyalty to occupiers.

territory (Robinson, 1972). In doing so, brokers expect that absorbing occupiers' traits into their own society can improve their nations' overall economic/political conditions. In a broad and technical sense, all types of collaborators can be branded "brokers" (or mediators) in that they fill in the gap between two different communities in which exists an absence of a connection (see Burt, 1982). However, only those collaborators in this category that maintain a balance between occupiers and their countrymen can be called brokers. As a result, these collaborators are more likely to enjoy more influential power and legitimacy under occupation than others. Although they become brokers because of higher goals (i.e., doing what they believe is right), they also deliberately take advantage of this structural configuration when other types of collaborators cannot. In this sense, brokers' motives can be more instrumental about their collaboration than those of loyalists.

Third, *conformists* have a low level of loyalty to both occupiers and the occupied. Motives for collaboration among those within this category lie in either personal mundane ideology (e.g., opportunism and materialism) or simple passiveness. Rather than having a higher ideology or goals, conformists are inclined to pursue the prospect of direct economic benefit. For instance, these collaborators are concerned primarily with the ways in which they can benefit from occupiers through land, tax cuts, and money as well as influential socio-economic positions as a reward for collaboration. Furthermore, being affected by their emotions, conformists use collaboration as personal opportunities to seek revenge on those who have given cold

and poor treatment such as landlords and managers. Collaborators in this category are most likely to regard other types of collaborators and even occupiers as their competitors. Although conformist can be active chasers of personal goals, they can be also passive respondents to their environment, as the term *conformist* originally implies. These collaborators support occupiers like most other people do, without demonstrating a strong intention to collaborate. They are locked into conformity by peer pressure out of a fear of losing support from their nationals and occupiers (see Mann, 2005).

Finally, *hostages* have a low level of loyalty to occupiers and a high level of loyalty to their nation. Despite their strong national identity, these collaborators are compelled to support occupation against their will. Collaborators in this category are usually refrained from expressing their ideas or following their own course of action due to pressure from occupiers, who threaten indigenous people through signals suggesting that—if they are not loyal to occupiers—they will lose a job or their family members, for example. Since forced collaboration can create tensions between collaborators' national identity and identities toward occupation, the possibility exists that collaborators in this category turn into another type of collaborators by compromising their identical conflicts. In some regards, their motives for collaboration are instrumentally rational in that they try to avoid difficulties that might jeopardize their lives. However, there may not be any room for rationality in collaborating because it is also possible that collaborators in this

category are terrified by occupiers' overwhelming threats and coercion.

Theoretical Frameworks

In order to understand the formation, development, and identity of pro-Japanese collaborators in Korea, this research will build upon a general theoretical framework of collaboration based on three related bodies of literature: colonialism, decision-making, and stigma. Studies of colonialism offer states goals and strategies for fostering collaboration in an occupied society. Studies of decision-making processes offer explanations about actors' choices for collaboration as well as exiting from collaboration. Finally, studies of stigma address actors' maintenance and defense of self-concepts.

Colonialism and Collaboration

Although indigenous collaboration is a quite common phenomenon in almost all occupations, the level, type, and practices of collaboration vary depending on the purpose of occupation—namely, colonialism versus imperialism. The underlying philosophies and developments of colonialism and imperialism overlap one another (Doyle, 1986; Fieldhouse, 1981); however, they are somewhat distinct from each other. First, conceptually, although imperialism is closed to political ideology or passion, colonialism is more like an actual process of merging a foreign territory into invaders' own (Doyle, 1986). Second, imperialism lasts longer and involves a broader spectrum of influence over occupied populations than colonialism. Third, whereas imperialism does not necessarily involve direct control of society—relying instead on temporary military occupation and remote

economic control—colonialism as a particular form of imperialism utilizes direct legal/political control over another territory and its people (Go, 2007). Finally, colonialism is more engaged than imperialism in the processes of assimilation, in which invaders make efforts to build a state or nation that is strikingly similar to their own (Kalyvas, 2008). Based on these differences between imperialism and colonialism, colonial occupiers may require more massive, comprehensive, and long-lasting cooperation from the occupied than imperial occupiers. For instance, although the Chinese Empire only needed collaborators from particular strata of society in the Asian countries that it invaded (e.g., royal members or elite groups), French and British colonizers needed collaboration from a wide spectrum in Asia and Africa, ranging from local guides and informants in small towns to high-ranking officials in the colonial administration.

Although diverse roles of collaborators overlap one another in colonized countries, they can also vary due to the different forms of colonialism itself. For example, since the goal of British colonizers in the United States, Canada, and Australia was to settle down (Go, 2007), they needed cooperative indigenous people who could help establish settlements and govern settlers. In contrast, with a purpose of capital accumulation (Myers et al., 1984), the British colonialism of India needed Indians who could assist in the construction of extensive bureaucratic systems to seek profits from India (Sharmir & Hacker, 2001). Meanwhile, French colonizers in Africa purported to seek cultural/social integration (Go, 2007); thus, they needed native

people who could facilitate the process of integrating African society into European society. On the other hand, driven by the need for economic exploitation, Spanish colonizers sought the guidance of native people who could help extract economic resources and destroy native societies in Latin America (Lockhart & Schwartz, 1983).

Finally, German colonizers aimed to create a competitive advantage (Steinmetz, 2007); as such, they needed the help of the Chinese to win the competition among Western invaders for domination in China.

Despite various forms of collaboration, patterned strategies have emerged in which the occupiers developed methods for incorporating collaborators into their colonial/imperial control. Collaboration usually begins from the upper strata of colonized society, composed primarily of elites (Golan, 2001; Shamir & Hacker, 2001; Robinson, 1986; Switting & Vickers, 2007; Vickers et al., 2003), although it becomes widespread as colonial processes develop. Those in influential positions such as government officials, big business leaders, and military generals tend to be the main targets for colonial allegiance because the occupiers could more effectively wield control through the aid of collaborators in such positions. For instance, European invaders incorporated traditional ruling classes in Asia and Africa into their colonial administrative systems to effectively control colonial countries remotely, which is called "indirect rule."³

³ The concept of "indirect rule" helps explain how occupiers successfully mobilize subjected populations; how "discourse at the top" differs from "fighting on the ground"; how collaboration becomes mutual relations rather than "unidirectional" relations between occupiers and collaborators, whereby collaborators have their own interests and incentives; and, finally, how collaboration in colonialism can be differentiated from that in military occupation or in post-colonialism (Kalyvas, 2008, pp. 139-140).

Moreover, occupiers are likely to have preexisting connections with the upper class—for example, those who have studied in the occupiers' countries. Given the high correlation between social class and preexisting connections (i.e., the elites are more likely to have studied abroad and have previous connections with occupiers), occupiers can take advantage of this connection with upper class as the first major step of their colonizing processes. Of course, collaboration often comes from the ground, as in Greek and Italian collaborators under Nazi Germany occupation and Chinese collaborators under Japanese occupation (e.g., Brook, 2005; Kalyvas, 2008; Wildvang, 2007). However, these are the cases of temporary military occupation in which the duration of occupancy is relatively short compared to colonialism (i.e., approximately a couple of years of duration). This line of thought suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. In the beginning of occupation, occupiers mobilize indigenous people mostly from the upper strata rather than from the ground in occupied society.

Second, occupiers take advantage of local social, ethnic/racial, regional, and religion cleavages to promote collaboration (Robinson 1972). For instance, in societies with intensive class conflicts, occupiers have allied themselves with the upper class against the lower classes because the upper class has incentives to cooperate with the occupiers due to their desire to maintain their high standing in society. If tensions exist between comparable ethnic groups, occupiers

are likely to be supported by the two competing groups. In doing so, occupiers end up expanding social cleavages through discriminative policies such as "preferential hiring, redlining residential districts, negative cultural stereotyping, offensive interpersonal behavior, and police harassment" (Mann, 2005, p.14). In a similar vein, although not a deliberate strategy for fostering collaboration, occupiers have induced more collaborators from particular regions in colonized society. For instance, occupiers usually invest economic resources into certain areas for the construction of infrastructure in colonies, such as railroads and military base camps, which consequently creates unequal distribution of collaboration over colonized society (see Golan, 2001). These ideas suggest the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis2. Occupiers exploit every possible cleavage in occupied society in order to induce collaboration, which in turn aggravates social relations through discrimination policies.

Hypothesis3. Collaboration disproportionately emerges from different parts of occupied society; more collaborators come from the areas that benefit most from occupiers.

Third, occupiers are likely to develop colonizing processes with a preferential priority in terms of various collaborative groups in colonized society. Since occupiers usually aim to legally and

politically incorporate target territory into their own in the initial stages of colonization, they need the aid of particular indigenous groups of people, such as high-level governmental officials or royal members, who sign off on the agreement to hand over the territory. Occupiers' overwhelming military power goes hand in hand with such territorial absorption. Of course, in such cases as Spanish and British colonialism, violent coercion was first exercised without the political and legal processes (Anderson, 2004). These occupiers required the support of army generals and high-ranking informants in order to seize the target territory. At the same time or slightly later, the occupiers needed indigenous economic actors such as capitalists and landlords to build up infrastructure for their long-term goals, such as effective resource mobilization and settlement. At this point, collaborative groups such as those from the media, education (see Switting & Vickers, 2007; Vickers et al., 2003), and the arts become necessary for the purposes of cultural assimilation, which includes banning religion and language from schools or offices, demagoguing, and changing family names. Although certain collaborative groups have not emerged in some examples of colonialism, this line of thoughts suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis4. In the time sequence of occupation, occupiers have a priority for fostering particular indigenous groups that correspond to their sub-plans of colonization in the order of (1) political/military groups, (2) economic groups, and (3) cultural groups.

The final steps in the process involve occupiers alternatively using metaphorical whips and carrots to signal to subjected populations that they both reward cooperation and sanction non-cooperation. Occupiers generally calculate the costs and benefits of maintaining effective collaborative networks (Ikeda, 2007; Kalyvas, 2006). One available option is the performance of just enough exemplary violence to make collaborators fully aware of consequences of defection from collaborative relations; another is to give a sense of obligation or satisfaction by rewarding collaborators' service for occupiers. Moreover, occupiers might encourage collaboration through preexisting indigenous social networks. Since social relations in most occupied countries are basically in the form of strong familial and tribal ties, one family member's collaboration is likely to involve collaboration of all family members. This line of thoughts gives rise to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5. Occupiers expand collaboration through the complementary usage of reward and coercion based on indigenous social networks.

Decision-Making Processes: Rational choice, habitus, and collective decision-making

Although occupiers' overall strategies for the creation of collaboration established the structural conditions within which collaboration had to occur, it does not necessarily account for the

reason why some collaborate with occupiers while others do not. In other words, analysis from the occupiers' demand side does not explain diverse individual agency that leads actors to collaborate. In fact, despite the controlling and domineering actions of occupiers, the occupied populations still possess agency and choose one from among several alternative courses of action. For instance, in response to occupation, one might leave his/her country to avoid occupiers' cruelty, decide to comply with occupiers' rule, or be willing to fight against occupiers rather than simply choose to become collaborators. Therefore, it is necessary to identify factors and conditions that influence actors' decisions and choices to collaborate as a critical behavior at a historical juncture of occupation. Moreover, at times during occupiers' rule when their power has been strong, collaborators have tended to support occupiers; however, as the occupiers' rule declines, they face a choice of whether to "exit" or "voice" occupation (see Hirshman, 1970). In fact, at the end of wars or occupation, political uncertainty has often existed in occupancy that manifested itself in both ways (i.e., "exit" and "voice").⁴ Therefore, the critical issue with which collaborators have tended to struggle was whether they should be more loyal to occupiers, who might be able to rescue them from uncertain political situations, or more loyal to the occupied populations, with whom they could have the ability to

⁴ Collaborators sometimes give counsel to occupiers in the hopes that the occupiers will make smart political decisions and maintain power and in the hopes that they themselves can maintain their political and economic status. On the other hand, those who choose to return to their nation (i.e., exit) are often not welcomed or accepted by their peers. Furthermore, occupiers often do not tolerate any collaborators' treacherous actions. However, collaborators also have to consider securing their position when the occupation ends.

reconcile should occupiers fail.

Among a number of theories, rational choice, habitus, and collective decision-making can provide relevant explanations regarding actors' decision-making processes. First, rational choice theorists argue that collaborators—as rational and self-interested actors—intentionally decide to collaborate with occupiers on the basis of available information. In fact, individuals are completely ignorant about how long the occupation will last, how much occupiers will respond to their interests, and so on. In this scenario, collaboration presents the most efficient and utility-maximizing choice based on a calculation of cost and benefits. Collaboration as rational decision-making would reduce uncertainty under the volatile political environment of occupation and thereby enhance actors' chances for survival. For instance, the ruling class is most likely to benefit from collaboration: Elite collaborators may rationally think that association with occupiers would keep them in power, so they can maintain their traditional and new benefits—such as exploitation of wealth as well as prestige and influence over society (Doyle, 1986). Furthermore, average people may believe that collaboration will provide them with everyday necessities such as food, housing, and healthcare.

However, accounts for collaboration based on rational choice theory have several limitations. First, rational choice theory cannot explain individuals' choice of action plagued by national ideology, political fevers, or cultural heritages. In most cases of occupied countries, if not all, many women are raped, men are shot, and

children starve to death. These atrocities of occupation may drive the occupied people to think that coming forward to collaborate can be their best choice for saving their lives as well as their family's lives. Some may decide to fight against occupiers, thinking that they can overcome them. However, individuals tend to risk costs (e.g., life, fame, and fortune) in response to a perceived wrongdoing (e.g., Kurzban et al., 2007) partly because of deeply rooted indigenous sentiments accumulated through long-term historical and political relations between occupiers and the occupied.⁵ Similarly, individuals' choices are not always rational, but can be highly subjective and emotional. Those who have received cold and poor treatment from their landlords and managers are likely to decide to collaborate with occupiers in order to seek revenge on those in the upper class. Furthermore, actors' rational desire to collaborate does not automatically lead to collaboration with occupiers. In other words, social/political obstacles exist that prevent them from being collaborators no matter how hard occupied people try to establish a connection with occupiers. By the same token, rational choice theory overlooks the fact that actors' actions are often neither deliberate nor intentional (Shafir et al., 1993). For example, collaborators may happen to collaborate with occupiers because of opportunities from their structural positions (e.g., social class) or because of threats by occupiers.

In fact, studies of habitus have tried to overcome the aforementioned limitations of rational choice theory by understanding

⁵ This is ideologically driven action, what Weber (1954) calls value-rational action.

"pre-rational" factors that influence the processes by which action arises (Derlugian, 2005). According to Bourdieu's concept of habitus (1977), behavior is an outcome of actors' continuous interaction with their environment and other actors. For instance, collaborators determine and calculate their actions for collaboration by referring to existing norms, rules, and values comprised by others' expectations in standard social/cultural settings as well as personal particular experiences (see Eisenberg, 2007). Although these decision-making processes involve rational consideration about possible outcomes for collaboration, this rational consideration is not only influenced by collaborators' emotional and subjective motivations, but also conditioned by references such as existing norms, rules, and values. Therefore, actors whose family backgrounds or social classes are similar are more likely to be engaged in the same trajectory of actions because such similarities operate as a solid basis of references for their decision-making. For instance, fallen elites actively participate in collaboration with occupiers because they believe that service to their new occupiers would redeem their lost authority and power (see Derlugian, 2005). However, habitus cannot entirely account for the decisions of collaboration because too many unexplained deviant actors exist despite similarities in their social and cultural backgrounds. In fact, many upper-class indigenous people who have ties with occupiers choose to resist (see Brook, 2005) while people from different backgrounds serve occupiers.

Ivan Ermakoff's (2008) theory of collective decision-making—called "a theory of collective abdications"—provides useful insights

to account for how groups of individual actors reach tacit agreement about a certain course of action. The underlying assumptions of his theory are that actors who make decisions are not isolated from one another and are well aware of their situation by acquiring information from their peers. Collaboration under occupation is one of the most difficult decisions. Due to national sentiments, collaborators do not want to be alone in this critical moment; rather, they continuously check and interpret their peers' thoughts and behaviors (especially prominent peers who take a public stance). The key to the choice of collaboration lies in the group's collective knowledge about their situation accumulated by directly facing social interactions. Therefore, the choice of collaboration is made in a collectivity and interactionally that is not of individuals' own choosing. This line of thoughts suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6. Indigenous people collectively come forward to collaborate with occupiers based on peer group knowledge.

Stigma and Identity Shift

The examination of how occupiers fostered indigenous collaboration and how the occupied made initial judgments for collaboration do not necessarily tell exactly what happened after occupation. Within an occupied society, intensive tensions usually arise between the non-collaborative occupied and collaborators. Collaborators' occupation of the gray zone between occupiers and the occupied is not tolerated under foreign control because—although

occupiers demand loyalty from collaborators—the occupied expect collaborators to remain loyal to their nation. In addition, as bitterness and distrust begin to complicate the relationships between occupiers and the occupied, the tension puts pressure on collaborators to forgo their neutrality. Non-collaborators are most likely to have negative feelings toward those who support the non-native government and even go so far as to stigmatize these collaborators as they witness those whom they regarded as peers walking hand-in-hand with foreign occupiers. Meanwhile, collaborators need to justify their actions due to subtle (or immense) pressure from their nationals or due to a sense of morality based on their national identity. Consequently, collaborators might experience ambivalent feelings and beliefs about their national identity and loyalty. Thus, the question becomes in what way does the configuration of relationships arising within the occupied society impact collaborators' identities?

Erving Goffman's (1963) work on stigma fills the explanatory gap between the rise of conflicts within society and the shape of one's identities. According to Goffman (1963), someone's reaction has severe impact on others' social/normal identity. People usually make assumptions about what others should be based on their sense of righteousness, morality, justice, and so on, marking those who do not meet such normative criteria. Meanwhile, the marked are motivated to defend themselves from the markers' evaluation in order to preserve their self-esteem, dignity, reputation, etc. In the process, the essential component of the marked people's self-conceptions undergoes considerable changes. Drawing on Goffman's work, abundant research on

social stigma has emerged to examine discredited individuals with minor sexual identities (Lindsay et al., 2006) and HIV/AIDS (Devine et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2008), who have health-related matters (for a review, see Graham, 2009), who experienced the Holocaust (Stein, 2009), who have records of incarceration (Schnittker & John, 2007), and who have a combination of old age and sexually transmitted diseases (Lichtenstein, 2008), to name a few. Although most psychological research understands stigma as personal traits and attributes rather than social relations (Castro & Farmer, 2005), an overall agreement—along the lines of Goffman's work—asserts that stigma involves ongoing social processes in which both those who stigmatize and the stigmatized interact with each other based on their implicitly (or explicitly) shared normative codes of behaviors (see Brown & Trujillo, 2003; Manzo, 2004).

Collaborators bear stigma because they contribute to illicit foreign occupation, which undermines the interests of the occupied nationals. In this sense, stigma that collaborators earn does not come from what they are, but from what they do. Since the average occupied are relatively free from the influence of occupiers and thereby hold relatively strong national identity and beliefs (see Freidson, 1983), it is the average occupied who remain normal during occupation, especially when it comes to the matter of national consciousness. Accordingly, collaborators cannot stigmatize the average occupied, but rather become an object of stigma even if they constitute a salient or crucial group that can wield power over the occupied society. Therefore, stigma becomes both offensive and defensive tools of which

the weak can make use during occupation. Most of all, stigma is an exercise of and request for the correction of abnormality. According to Durkheim([1893] 1984), society requires a strong reaction, such as any form of punishment, in order to preserve its own standards of morality, which consequently infiltrates individuals' collective conscience through forms of shared beliefs and sentiments. Similarly, the average occupied population can try to maintain their solidarity by stigmatizing collaborators so long as they are not determined to entirely devote themselves to occupiers. Moreover, stigma is a means of preserving one's identities and self-esteem. Faced with violence, threats, and dehumanization under occupation, the average occupied population should at least be able to find a way to keep their dignity unless they have enough power to overcome the occupying force. As such, the average occupiers mark collaborators with pejorative symbols (e.g., traitors, puppets). This line of thoughts suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7. The occupied stigmatize collaborators for group solidarity and self-defense.

In turn, the stigmatized (i.e., collaborators) are motivated to defend themselves because they experience discrimination, rejection, scorn, insults, attacks, and so on from the stigmatizers (i.e., the average occupied) even if they get the upper hand in the occupied society. First, collaborators may handle stigma through veiling, denial, and deception in order to avoid exclusion from the occupied-

what Goffman (1963) calls "passing." Since collaboration is quite manifest and visible to others, unless one's job is similar to being a secret agent for an occupying force, maintaining secrecy about collaboration may not be a plausible strategy for avoiding stigma under occupation. However, collaborators can adopt this strategy (e.g., elimination of all records relevant to their past/current collaborative activities) especially when political changes arise (e.g., weakening or exiting occupiers). Second, collaborators can defend themselves from stigma through the justification of their collaborative activities, which garners sympathetic reactions from non-collaborators. Collaborators usually persuade non-collaborators that collaboration can lead to the improvement of national interests in the long run. Third, collaborators can deal with stigma by alluring non-collaborators to their side so that they can diminish the amount of normative pressure from the average occupied. Means of enticement to collaboration includes both persuasion and coercion with ideology, economic benefit, violence, and so on. Finally, collaborators can cope with stigma through their collective action, such as memberships in social/political events. Collaborators are provided with opportunities to socialize with occupiers in the context of social/political organizations and informal clubs. When collaborators jointly participate in such events, they can create strong bonds with one another through frequent social interaction (see Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Although such collectivity of collaborators benefits occupiers, who can pursue the political interests of control, collaborators may have difficulty dealing with anger and resentment from their

countrymen. Therefore, for instance, collaborators become assassination targets of nationalists as an attempt to resist occupiers. However, as the number of collaborators who have memberships in occupier-sponsored social/political events increase, it becomes easier for collaborators to confront stigma because of the supports and invalidation provided by their increasingly large networks. This line of thoughts suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis8. Collaborators defend themselves from stigma through secrecy, justification, allurements, and collective actions.

Overall, the processes of stigmatizing and being stigmatized can affect collaborators' behaviors as well as shape the concept of self. The stigmatized usually experience intensive psychological challenges, such as depression and anxiety (see Heatherton et al., 2000; Major & O'Brian, 2005). Moreover, active attempts to attack and kill due to stigma put significant pressure on collaborators so that they may become more defensive and even reliant on the protection of occupiers. Therefore, in the long run, collaborators are likely to end up either forgoing their national identity to a considerable degree and thereby transforming themselves into zealous supporters of occupiers or justifying their collaborative activities and convincing the average occupied of their great contribution to the nation. In other words, stigma can change a certain type of collaborators ultimately into either loyalists or brokers, as previously defined herein.

A Case Study

This research will trace in detail Japanese colonialism and pro-Japanese collaboration in Korea from 1910 to 1945. The purposes of the Japanese colonial/imperial expansion into Korea are significantly similar to those of European colonialism/imperialism—namely, a mixture of capital accumulation, competitive advantage, economic exploitation, and cultural/social integration into a Greater Japan. In order to achieve effective colonial rule, the Japanese imperial state constructed a centralized bureaucratic system and accumulated military/political strength in the occupied territory, transferring every component of its own society (e.g., legal sovereignty and culture) to the colony (Myers et al., 1984). Based on such centralized and localized administrative organizations, the Japanese applied influence, power, and violence on the subjected population. Although the Japanese could have relied entirely on brutal military intervention to make the Koreans fully aware of their overwhelming state power, this approach would have been too expensive. A less costly option was to entrust groups of people from Korean society with the responsibility of domination so that they could influence/supervise their fellow occupied people. To this end, the Japanese imperial state utilized the tactic of massive collaboration as a tool for effective colonial governance.

Indeed, in the beginning stages of the occupation, the Japanese imperial state was able to officially take over the Korean territory with the crucial help of five Korean ministers, called the Five Eulsa

Traitors⁶ by Koreans. Among eight ministers in total, five signed the Eulsa Treaty in 1905, which was a cornerstone of the Korea-Japan annexation in 1910 despite the opposition voiced by Korean Emperor Gojong and other Korean officials. Japan's Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi persuaded and coerced Korean government officials to cooperate with Japan, insisting that Korea should be under the Japanese protection in order to cope with the threat of Western imperial expansion. After gaining control over the Korean government in 1905, the Japanese were able to increase the number of collaborators by removing those who were not supportive of the Japanese. While sending signals that Japanese armed forces were always ready to punish non-cooperative/rebellious actions, the Japanese offered tangible and intangible rewards to collaborators so that they would commit themselves to overt channels of colonial policy and incorporate other family members into collaboration. When the Japanese offered a new treaty in 1907, more officials joined the movement to relinquish Korean sovereignty to Japan.

In response to Japan's direct political and administrative control, massive resistance and independence movements emerged in Korea, which in turn made the Japanese occupation policy switch from violent coercion to non-violent control. After the treaty in 1905, some private groups organized to assassinate the Five Eulsa Traitors and other collaborators; others (e.g., former military and irregular army groups) raised armies throughout the country from 1907 to 1918.

⁶ They were Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry Minister Gwon Jung-hyeon; Foreign Affairs Minister Pak Je-sun; Army Minister Yi Geun-taek; Interior Minister Yi Ji-yong; and Education Minister Yi Wan-yong.

Confucian and Christian communities, intellectuals, and businessmen also participated in numerous independence movements. These reactions were deeply rooted in Koreans' collective identity and sentiments coming from long-term historical relations between the two countries. From the Korean perspective, Japanese control damaged their national pride—Koreans had always looked down on the Japanese as uncivilized and warlike barbarians—and made Koreans recall the Imjin War (i.e., the Japanese invasion of Korea from 1532 to 1539) as well as other numerous skirmishes for several hundred years afterwards, thereby inculcating Koreans with the viciousness and brutality of the Japanese. Such national sentiments from the Japanese control and national history culminated in the March 1st Movement in 1919, whereby approximately two million Koreans participated in Korea's declaration of independence. The nationwide movement did not drive the Japanese out, but changed the Japanese occupation policy. Instead of violent suppression using military police and soldiers, the Japanese used a civilian force and allowed Koreans to have autonomy to some degree. Ironically, however, the number of collaborators soared after the March 1st Movement. In particular, a considerable number of intellectuals on the steadfast nationalist side became Japanese supporters by arguing that it was not a bad idea for Koreans to be the subject of the Imperial Japan.

The Japanese occupation policy dramatically changed due to the strong resistance of the occupied populations as well as their imperialistic ambition. Under the flag of the Greater Japan, the Japanese project of transforming Korea into its commissary base began

in earnest after the Japanese Invasion of Manchuria in 1931. While occupying Manchuria, Sakhalin, Southeast China, and Southeast Asian countries, the Japanese constructed the infrastructure for exploiting resources from Koreans in Korea: factories for military supplies in the capital area, power plants in the border area, and plantation camps in rice field areas. Moreover, as a part of a national integration project, the Japanese prohibited Koreans from using their native language, forced them to convert to the Japanese religion, and forced them to change their family names to Japanese ones. Moreover, after the break in the Pacific War in 1937, the Japanese forcefully mobilized conscripted Korean labor and soldiers and comfort women (i.e., female sex slaves for Japanese soldiers) into the war. Overall, a large number of Koreans voluntarily or forcefully supported the project of the Greater Japan after 1930.

Korean collaborators' national identity and loyalty vacillated depending on their actions, with whom they were connected, and in what historical moment they were situated, which is why all collaborators under Japanese occupation cannot be categorized into a single entity as previously discussed. In fact, as collaboration continued, collaborators' ambivalence about their position was no longer tolerated by the Japanese and Koreans due to political/normative pressure from both sides that eliminated any middle ground. The political/normative pressure to choose a side became particularly intense because many nationalistic Koreans hated the Japanese and launched a movement of resistance and independence. The intensifying political/normative pressure forced collaborators to solidify their

identities as either loyal Koreans or Japanese allies. Thus, some collaborators responded by becoming financial supporters of the Korean independent movements, while others became increasingly loyal supporters of Japanese imperial policy. Furthermore, the formation and shift of national identity and loyalty became institutionalized, even structural processes. For instance, those who voluntarily enlisted in the army with materialistic motives turned into loyalist collaborators later in their careers, especially during the Pacific War. Disciplined as an agent of suppressive and violent apparatus on behalf of the Japanese, these volunteer soldiers became cruel and brutal in their treatment of fellow Koreans by faithfully responding to the request of the Japanese. Although today it is clearer why collaborators had to choose a side, it is unclear about the way in which they chose the side they did. Thus, the current research aims to explain these choices of identity and loyalty.

Research Design

The main purpose of this research design is to discover the patterns of the development of collaborators by the Japanese imperial state and by the collaborators themselves as well as to ascertain how these patterns play critical roles in the shifting of collaborators' identities and loyalty throughout the process of collaborationist activities. This research design consists of two levels that are fundamentally intertwined but analytically separated: the demand side and the supply side of collaboration. To reveal the mechanism of the creation of collaboration by occupiers as one of the most critical events in colonialism, data will be surveyed over time on the Japanese

strategies of fostering collaboration from colonial archives in South Korea and Japan. In addition, a causal explanation of collaborators' decision-making and identity shift through stigma under the Japanese colonial rule will be provided by collecting data related to collaborators' activities under Japanese occupation from universities and research institutes in South Korea. These processes of the creation of collaborators and their changing identities will be examined using sequence analysis, content analysis, and a thick description. The following sections further describe the empirical research sources and methods.

Research Question 1

What strategies did the Japanese imperial state utilize in order to incorporate pro-Japanese collaborators into the colonial ruling?

Hypothesis. The Japanese induced collaborators mostly from the upper strata in the beginning of occupation, subsequently expanding the number and scope of collaborators throughout the Korean population through the exploitation of social cleavages, the disproportionate economic development, and the alternative usage of persuasion and coercion.

Data. To evaluate this argument, historical survey data and documentation of Japanese imperial policies from historical archives and governmental and local academic institutes will be examined. In Japan, the National Diet Library (NDL), the Library of the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense (NIDSMD), and the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JCAHR) house documents relating to Japanese foreign policies since the Meiji Restoration in

1862 as well as the distribution and structure of colonial administrative systems. In addition, because the United States captured documents related to imperial Japan after the Pacific War, available online data will be accessed at the Asian Reading Room (ARR) in the U.S. Library of Congress. In Korea, three special government institutes that focus on investigating matters relating to the Japanese rule—the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCICJI), the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism Republic of Korea (TCFMJI), and the Investigative Commission on Pro-Japanese Collaborators' Property (ICPCP)—have obtained large numbers of primary documents from the aforementioned Japanese archive and library and translated them into Korean. These Korean governmental institutes also hold crucial reviews and documents regarding victims of imperial Japanese violence (e.g., interview records regarding female sex slaves for Japanese soldiers as well as conscripted laborers and soldiers) and collaborationist activities (e.g., who they were, their numbers, what they did and said, where and how they lived).

Method. The methods of this project will consist of archival work at these institutes in South Korea and Japan, followed by analysis of academic and governmental publications and of public documents. Research will be conducted on Japanese strategies for the production and maintenance of collaboration broadly over three time periods: (1) before 1919, (2) between 1919 and 1930, and (3) after 1930 (and before 1945). The changing numbers of collaborators will be compared in terms of their class, occupation groups, and regions over time. Sequence

analysis will be used to directly understand the shifting Japanese action toward indigenous collaborators depending on "particular social times and places" (see Abbott, 1997; Abbott & Tsay, 2000; MacIndoe & Abbott, 2004). Although I cannot speak Japanese, I can read the Chinese characters that most Japanese documents use. I am presently studying Japanese to have a better understanding of the Japanese documents. I will continue to study Japanese upon my return.

Research Question 2

How did collaborators make decisions and choices for collaboration?

Hypothesis. Collaborators collectively decided to collaborate with occupiers by referring peers.

Data. To examine this argument, historical and contemporary resources will be searched, such as a biographical encyclopedia of pro-Japanese collaborators during the colonial period published by the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities (IRCA)⁷ and historical surveys and publications managed by the National Archive of Korea (NAK), the Nation Library of Korea (NLK), and the National Institute of Korean History (NIKH). At PCICJ, historical documents will be gathered related to the 682 collaborators prosecuted by the Special Committee for Prosecution of Anti-National Offenders, which was established after Korean emancipation in 1948. Moreover, multiple documents such as newspaper reports, diaries, public speeches,

⁷ This institution has been engaged in identifying collaborators who supported the imperial Japanese in order to reveal collaborators' roles in the atrocities of the colonial ruling since 1989.

letters, published articles, and written memoirs before 1945 will be examined.

Method. Archive work will be conducted at IRCA, NAK, NLK, and NIKH in South Korea, and published sources will be reviewed and interpreted. The decision-making processes of three collaborative groups—namely, (1) the Five Eulsa Traitors, (2) intellectual collaborators from the strong nationalist side after 1919, and (3) coerced collaborators after 1930—will be tracked down. In particular, this stage will involve delving into the reason as to why the number of collaborators increased after the massive indigenous resistance, the March 1st Movement, by looking into the send collaborator group. Qualitative text analyses will be conducted to determine what collaborators did, felt, thought, feared, and anticipated, as expressed in texts, as well as to examine how such information reveals the moment of a choice of collaboration. As none of the Korean nationals on the ground level left a diary, memoir, or letter regarding their service to Japan, the current research subject will be limited to those who had prominence under occupation.

Research Question 3

How did collaborators' identities and loyalty shift as their collaboration went on (e.g., from conformists to loyalists, from hostages to brokers, and so on)?

Hypothesis. Collaborators' identities and loyalty shifted in response to the stigma that came from average Koreans.

Data. To evaluate this argument, historical ethnographic texts and periodicals published during the colonial period at NAK, NLK, and

NIKH will be collected. Especially, the list of assassination targets written by numerous Korean military groups (e.g., Righteous Armies and Korean Liberation Army) at IRCA will be collected in order to understand the reaction of indigenous people. Also, multiple sources such as newspaper reports, diaries, public speeches, letters, published articles, and written memoirs before 1945 will be examined again to keep track of collaborators' defensive strategies from stigma and their identity shift.

Method. Archive work will be carried out at IRCA, NAK, NLK, and NIKH in South Korea, and published sources will be reviewed and interpreted. Especially, reputations and evaluations regarding the three collaborative groups aforementioned will be thickly described in order to reveal how indigenous population stigmatized these collaborators (e.g., Geertz, 1973). Again, qualitative text analyses will be conducted to understand collaborators' cognitive processes (e.g., emotions and motives), as well as to examine how collaborators defended themselves from stigma, which in turn, affected their identity. Although it is possible to have interviews with survivors of the Japanese colonial rule to ask about their memories of collaborators, this method is highly unlikely because someone, say, at the age of twenty who collaborated with the Japanese at the last moment of the Japanese occupation, say, in 1940, is eighty-nine years old now.

Statement of Qualification

Pre-dissertation research supported by the Social Science Research Council enabled me to set up a concrete bottom line of this

proposed research. First of all, I was able to figure out most essential research sites for my project and to collect crucial data regarding the Japanese occupation and Korean collaborators from several scholars and researchers at the government and civic research institutes in South Korea and Japan. In particular, the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities (IRCA) allowed me to have unlimited access to the data set they had collected over twenty years. Most importantly, conversation with several historians in Korea, Japan, and the U.S. not only gave me exposure to a broad and various opinions from disciplines other than sociology, but also enabled me to develop specific research questions and hypotheses. Moreover, connection with Stathis Kalyvas and Ivan Ermakoff, whose research interests are closely relevant to mine, enabled me to improve the theories, concepts, and methods for this proposed research.

Research Schedule

Phase I: March, 2010 - May, 2010: three months in Tokyo, Japan and Seoul, Korea

The objective of this period is to collect historical survey data and documentation of Japanese imperial policies for inducing collaboration into colonial rule from historical archives and governmental and local academic institutes in Korea and Japan.

Phase II: June, 2010 - August, 2010: three months in Seoul, Korea

The objective of this second period is to identify the existence of collaborators, their decision-making relevant to their motives, emotions, and activities, their reputations and stigma from the perspectives of average Korean nationals, and their de-

fensive strategies from stigma and shifting identity processes.

Phase III: September 2010 - February, 2010: six months in Seoul, Korea
and the U.S.

The objective of the last period is to write up the results in my dissertation based on the data gathered during the previous two phases of research.

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Life Under Occupation

Middle East Resource Spring 2010



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The Siege on Palestinian Life

Introduction

In the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt)¹, nearly every facet of life is controlled by Israeli military policies. These policies not only restrict movement, but also isolate and harass the civilian population. The state of siege, which relates in this context to fully or partially preventing residents from entering or leaving a certain area, while isolating the area from other parts of the West Bank², is marked by closures, regular curfews, roadblocks, checkpoints, electric fences, and walls, in addition to other obstacles which affect the normalcy of Palestinian daily life. Gaza suffers these restrictions and more, especially since the blockade imposed on Gaza after Hamas was elected in 2006. It is extremely difficult to move people or goods within or out of the oPt, which has devastating effects on the Palestinian economy, weakening its infrastructure and institutions. Israel's siege is a form of collective punishment that violates the dignity of the Palestinian people and their basic human rights. It also violates international law and articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention that govern the treatment of civilians in war and under occupation³.

Freedom of Movement

Freedom of movement is a guaranteed right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights⁴ as well as the Declaration of Human Rights. According to a 2007 World Bank publication, "currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI (Government of Israel) and the PA (Palestinian Authority)."⁵ The following elements of occupation inhibit freedom of movement in the oPt.

Closure and Curfew

The term "closure" refers to the restrictions placed by Israel on the free movement of Palestinian goods and people across borders within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while "curfew" refers to a total lock-down of a Palestinian town. Closure takes three basic forms: (i) internal closure is the sealing off of Palestinian population centers within the oPt from one another, preventing movement within the West Bank; (ii) external closure is the sealing off of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel proper and from each other; (iii) and the closing of international crossings, severely constraining Palestinians' ability to travel abroad.⁶

- The severity of the closure changes as circumstances change. For example, after incidents of Palestinian violence against Israelis, authorities often impose a total closure on the occupied territories. Israel frequently imposes a total closure on the oPt during Israeli and Jewish holidays.

- Since the second Intifada (uprising) in 2000, Israel has imposed a total closure on the oPt and has prohibited most Palestinian movement between the oPt and Israel and between the West Bank and Gaza.

- During curfews, Palestinians remain under sustained house arrest, sometimes for days and weeks on end. Businesses are closed and life is largely forced to a halt. Curfew also applies to international aid workers.

- The Israeli military imposes curfews during military operations in West Bank villages and cities, and at times imposes curfew as punishment. Following stone throwing in a village, for instance, the army sometimes imposes a curfew on all or part of the village for a few hours or even a few days.

- Closures and curfews have prevented Palestinians from reaching their places of work and from distributing their products to internal and external markets, and have caused shortages.⁷



Israeli soldier checks Palestinian IDs

- At the end of a recent observation period, (September 2008 - March 2009) OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) recorded 47 curfews with a combined duration of 471 hours, a 15% increase from its previous period.⁸

Checkpoints, Roadblocks, and Forbidden Roads

One of the primary ways in which the siege is enforced is through the blocking of access roads to towns and villages by means of: permanent and temporary, or "flying" checkpoints (staffed), and roadblocks, in the form of dirt piles, deep trenches, or concrete blocks (not staffed).⁹ Palestinians are required to show an identity card or crossing permit. Additionally, many roads are restricted to Israeli vehicles only. Since 1991, Israel has required every Palestinian in the oPt wanting to enter Israel to obtain an exit permit from the occupation authorities. Approvals are granted infrequently and according to changing criteria often unknown to Palestinians. The Oslo Accord signed between the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel provided that the movement of people and vehicles "will be free and normal and shall not need to be effected through checkpoints and roadblocks."¹⁰





AFSC Photo

- 74 % of the main routes in the West Bank are controlled by checkpoints or blocked entirely.¹¹

- The movement restrictions have had devastating effects on the Palestinian economy and access to healthcare. Palestinians are often forced to wait for hours at checkpoints, keeping them from school and jobs, and making daily planning a challenging task.

- At the end of October 2009, there were a total of 578 closure obstacles within the West Bank (excluding border/Green Line crossings), including 69 permanently staffed checkpoints, 21 “partial checkpoints,” and 488 unstaffed obstacles.¹²

- Physical obstructions leave no room for flexibility in crossing, as they are unstaffed, and there is no one to remove the obstruction even in an emergency situation.

- At some checkpoints, especially in Nablus, Israel occasionally prevents men of a certain age group, usually 16-35, from crossing.

- B’Tselem regularly documents many instances in which soldiers at checkpoints prevent or significantly delay medical patients and the wounded from crossing, which has sometimes led to deterioration of their condition, women giving birth at checkpoints, and even death.

The Separation Barrier/Wall

“The construction of the wall being built by Israel... in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem... [is] contrary to international law. Israel is under obligation... to dismantle forthwith the structure... [and] make reparation for all damage caused...”

-International Court of Justice advisory opinion, July 9, 2004¹³

Israel began constructing the Wall in 2002. It consists of a series of 25-ft high concrete slabs, trenches, barbed wire, electrified fences, numerous watch towers, thermal imaging video cameras, sniper towers, and roads for patrol vehicles. Israel claims that the Wall was built to protect Israel proper from attacks and that it was to be a temporary structure. However, in September 2008, OCHA commented that, “what was once justified by the Israeli authorities as a short-term military response (...) appears to be developing into a permanent system.”¹⁴ The Wall does not only severely restrict Palestinian farmers’ ability to tend to and harvest their crops, it also impairs them from selling their produce. The olive industry, which provides around 18% of the annual agricultural production income in the West Bank, has not only been harmed by the cutting down of tens of thousands of trees, but also by the lack of ability of the farmers to harvest and sell their produce. The overall damage caused by the destruction of land and property for the Wall’s construction will take many years to recover, further hindering Palestinian development.

- In a November 2009 report, OCHA states that the Barrier continues to be the single largest obstacle to Palestinian freedom of movement.¹⁵

- As of October 2009, 60% of the Wall has been completed. Construction is ongoing in the West Bank districts of Qalqilya, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron.¹⁶

- Approximately 16% of the Wall is being built on the 1967 Green Line, the accepted border between the West Bank and Israel proper, while 84% is located in the West Bank itself.¹⁷

- Approximately 35,000 West Bank Palestinians will be located between the Wall and the Green Line (an area known as “no man’s land” or the seam zone). They require permits to live in their homes and can only leave their communities via a gate in the Wall.



© Reuters Photo by: Ahmad Jadallah

Settlements


"The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop."

-President Barack Obama, Cairo Speech, June 2009²⁵

A May 2009 OCHA publication on movement and access in the oPt notes that Israeli settlements remain the most important factor shaping the system of movement and access restrictions.¹⁸ Settlements are Israeli-only colonies established throughout the West Bank. The settlements are illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations.

• A July 2004 International Court of Justice Ruling stated, "Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development [...] and] have been established in breach of international law."¹⁹

Settlements Established and Evacuated 1967-2008



• A November 2009 UN report stated that there were 121 Israeli settlements and approximately 100 Israeli outposts built illegally on Palestinian land by the end of 2008. Israeli outposts are considered illegal even under Israeli law.²⁰

• As of 2008, the total population of settlers was 475,380²¹, 180,000 of whom live in East Jerusalem, whose annexation by Israel in 1967 is not internationally recognized.²²

• The settler population has grown consistently between 4-6% per year over the last two decades, a much higher rate of growth than Israeli society as a whole (1.5%). Israelis moving to the West Bank accounted for more than a third of settler population growth in recent years, according to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics.²³

• Settlements are built on less than 3% of the area of the West Bank. However, due to the extensive network of settler roads and restrictions on Palestinians accessing their land, Israeli settlement councils control more than 40% of the West Bank.²⁴

Settler Violence

• According to OCHA, 80-90% of the files opened against Israeli settlers following attacks on Palestinians and their property are regularly closed by the Israeli police without prosecution.²⁶

• A new pattern of violence, which Israeli settlers call the "price tag" or "mutual responsibility" strategy, emerged during 2008. Groups of settlers exact a "price" against Palestinians and their property in response to occasional attempts by the Israeli authorities to dismantle "unauthorized" settlement outposts. According to one Israeli settler, "For every act of destruction [of an outpost] in the southern Hebron hills we will set fire to Samaria [northern West Bank]."²⁷

• "Considering Israel's obligations under international law, the Israeli authorities must adopt all the necessary measures to prevent to the greatest extent possible attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and their property, in response to the removal of settlement outposts," a UN report stressed, adding that in 2009, on average 13 Palestinians per month were injured in settler-related violence.²⁸



Palestinian vehicle damaged by settler attack

B'Tselem Photo by: Salma a-Dibi

The Tightening Noose on Gaza

The Gaza Strip, a 25-mile long (4-7.5 mile wide) area of land along the Mediterranean Sea just north of Egypt, is home to 1.5 million Palestinians. About one-third of its residents are registered refugees living in camps established in 1948. Since Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary elections, the United States and Israel have led a campaign of sanctions and closures against the residents of Gaza. Gaza's border with Israel and its border with Egypt are heavily guarded, and Israel controls Gaza's airspace and territorial waters.

Since June 2007, Israel has prohibited many materials from entering Gaza, forcing 90 percent of industrial enterprises to cease operations.³⁴ In March 2010, Israel began allowing shoes into Gaza for the first time in three years. More than a year after the Dec 2008-Jan 2009 Israeli assault on Gaza, "Operation Cast Lead," which left 1,3000 Palestinians dead, over 5,000 injured, and more than 50,000 homeless, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is severe. UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes, upon arriving in Gaza on 2 March, 2010 stated: "It is disturbing to see that more than a year after "Cast Lead," the unacceptable blockade continues and all that we can offer to the people of Gaza is limited to temporary shelters and emergency assistance. No meaningful reconstruction has started yet. I could see for myself today the continuing erosion of livelihoods and people's ability to lead anything resembling a normal life."³⁵

Between January-December, 2009, Oxfam reports only 41 truckloads of construction material were allowed to enter Gaza, making it impossible to rebuild homes, hospitals, schools, and water networks.³⁶ In August 2009, poverty stood at approximately 80% and unemployment at 60% in Gaza.³⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1860 "calls for the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance, including of food, fuel and medical treatment."³⁸ The World Bank June 2009 report on Palestinian Economic Prospects stated that the schemes for recovery in Gaza have not yet led to any impact on the ground due to the continued closure.³⁹

Due to the complete closure in Gaza, many Palestinians rely on underground tunnels with Gaza's Egyptian border to obtain supplies that are denied by the blockade. However, in December 2009, Egypt began construction on an underground steel wall along its border with Gaza in an attempt to prevent smuggling. The Egyptians are being assisted by American army corps engineers who designed the wall. The wall will take 18 months to complete and will be 6-7 miles long, extending 18 meters below the surface. Abed Elrahman al-Assouli from Khan Younis, Gaza, commented, "When we get a political solution, there will be no need for tunnels. I don't think this new wall will affect the smuggling, we are talking about thousands of tunnels."⁴⁰

"As long as Israel has control of the transfer of necessities and the supply of humanitarian needs to the Gaza Strip, it is bound by the obligations of international humanitarian law to allow the civilian population to have access, inter alia, to medical facilities, food and water, as well as additional humanitarian items."

-Justice Beinisch, UN Fact Finding Committee ⁴¹

Voices from the Region

From B'Tselem

Imad a-Natur, 17 years old, November 2009

"I started working when I was 13, because I'm the eldest and there was nobody else in my family to support us... Two years ago, I saw young people my age working in the tunnels and getting paid every day, even though they were minors. I realized this was the most worthwhile place to work, so I quit school and began to work in the tunnels... I work at lowering and moving the goods from the opening on the Egyptian side to the opening on the Palestinian side. Sometimes, I work during the day, sometimes at night. I work a 12-hour shift – from six to six... I'm always in danger of being killed. We often hear about a person who was killed or injured in the tunnels, and sometimes we see it happen. The Israeli planes bomb the tunnels every time a rocket is fired from the area at Israel. The bombs destroy the tunnels and kill and injure people working in them. When the Egyptians find a tunnel, they arrest the workers and bomb it. Sometimes in the winter, we stop working because rain enters the tunnel, and that can cause it to collapse, killing us. We are afraid, but what can we do? We won't stop working. If we did, we'd turn into street beggars. This is the only work to be had in the Strip nowadays. The siege and the closure have halted everything in the city. Factories and businesses closed, so many of the owners of the businesses and factories, laborers, and merchants went to work in the tunnels... That's our life in Gaza. It's a hard life, full of poverty and degradation."⁴⁴



B'Tselem Photo by: Muhammad Sabah

FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: IS THIS LEGAL?

Many of the aspects of the Israeli occupation violate international law and International Humanitarian Law. Most notable are the violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted in 1949, addressed the treatment and protection of civilians in times of war and conflict.

On July 15, 1999, the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, issued the following statement: "The participating High Contracting Parties reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem."⁴² Palestinians fall under the definition of protected persons, defined in Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."⁴³

The following are examples of Articles from the Fourth Geneva Convention that are violated by the Israeli military occupation:

Humane treatment for protected persons (Art. 27):

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Protection from unnecessary destruction (Art. 53):

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

Access to healthcare and hygiene (Art. 56):

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory... Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.



Access to food and medical care (Art. 55):

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

Assuring an adequate standard of living (Art. 39):

Protected persons who, as a result of the war, have lost their gainful employment, shall be granted the opportunity to find paid employment...Where a Party to the conflict applies to a protected person methods of control which result in his being unable to support himself, and especially if such a person is prevented for reasons of security from finding paid employment on reasonable conditions, the said Party shall ensure his support and that of his dependents.

Protection from collective

punishment (Art. 33): No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Assuring humanitarian access (Art.

59): If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal...All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and guarantee their protection.

Water

- Only in 16% of Palestinian communities does the per capita supply of water exceed 100 liters per day, which is the minimum amount recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO).²⁹

- In most of the Gaza Strip, salinity levels in water wells are above the limit established by the WHO and nitrate concentrations exceed WHO guidelines.³⁰ Only 7% of available water in Gaza meets WHO standards.³¹

- Israeli West Bank settlers domestically consume 280 liters of water per day, per person compared to 86 liters per day available for Palestinians in the West Bank.³²

- The preceding statistics represent only the 69% of Palestinian communities that are connected to water networks. The other communities are not reached by pipelines at all. Communities without linkages must rely upon rainfall, springs, wells, and water purchased by private suppliers.³³

Top Right: Water crisis in Jenin District



B'Tselem Photo by: Atef Abu A-Rob

AFSC principles and positions

AFSC's position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its commitment to nonviolent action for social change is based on the Quaker belief that there is that of God in every person. Within the framework of international law and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the AFSC strives for a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians that provides justice and security for all peoples living in the region.

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AFSC Photos (Top and Bottom Left)

Conclusion

The daily life of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is full of struggle and restrictions, a life under siege. The siege severely restricts civilian freedom of movement between Gaza and the West Bank and within the territories. It prevents families from seeing each other for months and years. Traveling even short distances often entails a lengthy, costly, and potentially dangerous journey. Detours to avoid blockades, checkpoints, and closed areas frequently take civilians miles out of their way and involve the risk of being turned back, harassed, beaten, or sometimes shot.⁴⁵ The lack of freedom of movement leads to the suffering of basic services like medical care and education. It complicates routine acts such as purchasing goods, visiting relatives, and studying at a university. In many cases, these routine acts are impossible. Economic development under military occupation is severely hampered, and often impossible. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said, "Palestinians have waited too long for an end to occupation."⁴⁶ The siege on Palestinian life is not a guard against violence, it is a systematic form of violence.



Five things you can do to help

- 1** Write a letter to the editor or Op Ed for your local paper.
- 2** Call your local newspapers and media stations to complain when they run erroneous reports on Israel's occupation - and to thank them when they get it right.
- 3** Contact your elected city, state, and national representatives to demand that U.S. policy support a just peace based on human rights and international law, and stop military aid to Israel until it ends the occupation.
- 4** Join a local peace and justice group and/or your local Quaker meeting and suggest a reading group or workshop series to learn more about the conflict.
- 5** Get your local group to join the U.S. Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation (www.endtheoccupation.org) to combine your efforts with others around the nation.