



THE COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20593-0001

U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY POLICY STATEMENT

The U.S. Coast Guard is America's maritime first responder and stands ready to protect the public from all threats and all hazards. All members of the Coast Guard forces play a critical role in every mission area – supporting maritime security, safety and stewardship. The Coast Guard Auxiliary provides capabilities and proficiencies that support these capacities and ensure we remain responsive to our communities and the Nation.

The Auxiliary is a force multiplier of vetted and trained volunteers devoted to the support of Coast Guard missions and provides a broad inventory of vital skills, assets, and experience for our units across the nation. As the leading volunteer organization in the Department of Homeland Security, it is an essential component of our daily operations and an effective resource primed to prevent and respond to catastrophes in the maritime region. Fittingly, the core strategic purpose of the Auxiliary is to continuously hone its expertise to perform three prioritized functions:

- (1) Promote and improve recreational boating safety;
- (2) Support Coast Guard maritime homeland security efforts; and
- (3) Support the Coast Guard's operational, administrative, and logistical requirements.

The Coast Guard Auxiliary shall remain *Semper Paratus*, providing a dynamic flexibility within its organizational programs in order to meet today's needs and tomorrow's challenges. Through focused partnerships and public outreach, it shall advocate and advance maritime domain awareness and the principles of safe boating. Its diverse assortment of vessels, aircraft, radio facilities, and vehicles shall be kept poised for the multi-mission tasking that characterizes Coast Guard operations. To its fullest measure, it shall engage opportunities to augment Coast Guard units through targeted recruitment and professional development among its membership.

Every commander, commanding officer, officer-in-charge, and program manager shall work closely with their Auxiliary counterparts to fully leverage the resources, skills, qualifications, and profound dedication that reside within the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Such focused collaboration is essential to our unwavering commitment to mission excellence in serving and protecting the public trust.

//S//

Thad W. Allen
Admiral, United States Coast Guard

Bravo Zero: The Coast Guard Auxiliary in World War II

By C. Kay Larson

National Historian

United States Coast Guard Auxiliary

In the Beginning. . .

In *Spirit of the Times's* 1901 history of American yachting, the author surveyed the activities of prominent yacht clubs around the country. According to the popular sporting magazine, the members of the Seawanhaka-Corinthian Yacht Club on Long Island--the home club of the Roosevelt family--were the first to promote of the idea of an American naval militia. Local boosterism aside, club members needed only to have read British yachting history to know that in England yachtsmen and the Royal Navy had had a close relationship going back to the Napoleonic Wars. At the time royal yacht club squadrons frequently participated in maneuvers with the navy. During the American Civil War, private American yachts were loaned or leased to the U.S. Navy. The New York Yacht Club's famous racing schooner, *Henrietta*, was loaned and commanded by its owner, James Gordon Bennett, Jr., son of the owner of the *New York Herald*. During World War I, the U.S. Naval Reserve organized yacht clubs like "The Boston" "into submarine watches to ease fear along the coast and raise morale by giving everyone a greater piece of the action." The BYC also formed a volunteer harbor patrol, although it soon disbanded due to cessation of hostilities. The 1916 naval reserve act provided for enrollment of civilian boats and crews "suitable for naval purposes in the naval defense of the coast." 1.

Given this history it is not surprising that during the 1930s, American boaters and yachtsmen began to press the U.S. Coast Guard for a role in its operations. One of these was Malcolm Stuart Boylan, Commodore of the Pacific Writers' Yacht Club in Los Angeles, California. On August 23, 1934, he wrote a letter to Lt. Francis C. Pollard of the Coast Guard, following a cruise Pollard had taken with the club. Boylan suggested the formation of a Coast Guard Reserve. The letter, in part, read:

This brings me to the suggestion that a Coast Guard Reserve would be an excellent thing to perpetuate these traditions, preserve its entity, and, more practically, to place at the disposal of Coast Guard officers, auxiliary flotillas of small craft for the frequent emergencies incident to your twenty-two prescribed and countless unexpected duties.

Later Boylan made trips to Washington to promote the idea which bounced around Coast Guard headquarters for five years. As the war clouds darkened over

Europe and the Pacific, Coast Guard officials began to recognize the need for more manpower on the homefront should hostilities break out. Within the Coast Guard itself, the future commandant Adm. Russell R. Waesche became the “prime mover and chief official angel” of the formation of the Auxiliary. He believed such a civilian organization could help lessen boating accidents and encourage adherence to laws and regulations.

By the mid-1920s, America had become largely a middle class society and was taking to the water like it was taking to the highways. The Coast Guard could not keep up with the growth of the recreational boating industry. This was greatly due to manufacturing technologies that dated to the development of mass-manufactured interchangeable parts in the mid-nineteenth century. To some extent, Henry Ford only added the assembly line. During the 1920s Christopher Columbus Smith's Chris Craft Company was the first to begin the mass manufacture of recreational boats. By 1936, the family cruiser had become the backbone of the U.S. motorboat industry. These cruisers would become the backbone of the World War II Auxiliary and CG Reserve small boat fleet. Without these social, economic, and technological advances that had been building in the country for more than a century, America would not have been able to provide the vessels that protected its coasts during World War II.

Giving voice to these demands in January 1939, Rear Adm. Thomas Molloy, USCG, gave a speech on small boat safety in New York in which he cited the increasingly large number of calls for assistance the Coast Guard was receiving from boaters. Three hundred thousand pleasure boats were cruising federal waters and an unknown number were operating on sole state waters. An estimated 150,000 outboards were skirting around the country, being the jet skis of their day. The Depression-era dam- and reservoir-building programs had brought man-made lakes under federal control and hydroelectric plants such as the Hoover Dam needed protection. Thus, the Coast Guard's prewar responsibilities had mushroomed considerably, in spite of the economic doldrums of the Depression.

In his speech, Molloy also recalled the work of civilian boaters in World War I. “Should a similar crisis arise in our national life again, your boats and your experience will be needed.” As a result of these factors and concerns on 24 April 1939, Rep. Schuyler Otis Bland of Virginia introduced Bill No. 5966 which would create a Coast Guard Reserve as a volunteer civilian force to promote small boat safety and to facilitate Coast Guard operations.

In testifying before Congress, Acting Treasury Secty. Steven P. Gibbons stated, “The Coast Guard had [sic] felt for some time a definite need for such an organization to assist in the performance of its duties. . .such as the conduct of regattas marine parades. .

.which might require facilities beyond those available to the regular Coast Guard.” The bill was signed into law on 23 June 1939. After its passage, the Coast Guard began to enroll volunteer crews and boats and established training programs for them. The basic operating unit, known as a flotilla, was comprised of a minimum of ten boat owners. Uniforms, insignia, flags, and burgees were designed. A Coast Guard officer would serve as the chief director in Washington and additional officers would direct Coast Guard District activities. By the end of 1940, the Coast Guard Reserve numbered 3,000 members who owned 2,700 boats, organized in 150 flotillas. 2.

As the prospects for U.S. involvement in World War II heightened, officials also saw the need for a military, as well as a non-military reserve. The Coast Guard required a force that could be called to active duty and whose personnel would be subject to military discipline and the articles of war. Thus on 19 February 1941, Congress amended the 1939 act to create the Coast Guard Reserve as a military reserve, and renamed the 1939 civilian reserve, the Coast Guard Auxiliary, maintaining its volunteer status and purposes. Under the terms of the February legislation, a Coast Guard petty officer would be assigned to every Auxiliary patrol.

A 1941 *Popular Science* article enthusiastically touted the virtues of the newly-minted Paul Reveres of the sea. The author recognized that two different sets of skills were needed to handle merchant ships versus small boats. While merchant mariners were entering the Navy, the Coast Guard was:

concentrating on its friends, the yachtsmen, whose knowledge of seamanship, navigation, and gas engines, plus familiarity with local waters and boatmen, makes a national-defense asset immediately convertible to a useful purpose. These men would be greenhorns aboard a battle-wagon, but along the line of their own hobby, many of them are extremely good. And so are their boats.

The *New York Times* reported in August 1941 that in nearly every yacht club along the East Coast “a batch of members had banded together in a Coast Guard Auxiliary flotilla.” By 1943, there also were approximately 100 women members; many were boaters on Lake Winnebago, Wisconsin. Initially these men and women assisted with search and rescue and the enforcement of the 1917 Espionage and the 1940 Federal Boating Acts and carried out collateral duties such as making deliveries to lighthouses. They also patrolled regattas like the Harvard-Yale boat race. 3.

During 1941, as German submarine attacks on U.S. ships became sporadic, in spite of its neutral status, America’s Battle of the Atlantic began. The Germans had been waging war against British shipping since 1939. American lives had been imperiled when British or neutral ships on which U.S. citizens had been traveling were torpedoed.

After the torpedoing of the U.S. merchant ship, *Robin Moor*, on 27 May, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared an Unlimited National Emergency.

In July, the Coast Guard called for the enrollment of 270 Auxiliary and other civilian vessels for use by Coast Guard Districts; each boat was to have six crew members. Waesche specifically cited the need to protect the Tennessee River Valley Authority lakes and other defense sites. Vincent Astor's 263-foot yacht, *Nourmahal*, "donned CG gray for the duration as a floating meteorological station." The service also commissioned 100 Reserve officers and 126 warrant officers. These men and vessels were added to a fleet of 276 cutters (72-foot or longer) and 199 picket boats. Most of the temporary Reserve boats were 30- to 40-feet in length and used for harbor patrols. More than 100 of the largest U.S. yachts had already been taken into service by the British government.

In September 1941, the German submarine threat was such that the Navy began convoying merchant shipping from Newfoundland to Iceland. On 1 November 1941, the Coast Guard was transferred from the Treasury Department to naval command, as required by law in wartime. 4.

On 7 December 1941, Japanese fighters and torpedo bombers attacked Pearl Harbor naval base in Honolulu, Hawaii, as well the Army's nearby Hickman Air Field. The surprise attack resulted in more than 3,500 casualties and America's entry into World War II. Members of the Honolulu Coast Guard Auxiliary rushed to the Coast Guard Station and conducted patrols of the harbor until the afternoon when they were relieved by regulars. San Francisco flotillas began night and day patrols on 7 December. Flotilla 27 of Seattle assisted the Navy by providing picket boats for its minesweepers doing checks of Puget Sound shipping lanes for enemy-laid mines. Nation-wide during the first six weeks of the war, the Auxiliary largely took over harbor patrols.

As a patriotic fervor swept the country following Pearl Harbor, hundreds of yachtsmen and other recreational boat owners flooded into existing Auxiliary flotillas and many new ones were created. Large numbers of men and women enrolled in order to qualify for commissions or ratings in the active duty Coast Guard. "Flotilla Commanders suddenly found themselves snowed under with work, day and night: patrolling, enlisting, organizing, teaching."

The "American Hunting Season"

On 12 December 1941, five days after Pearl Harbor and one day after Germany declared war on the United States, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Adm. Eric Raeder, naval commander-in-chief, met in conference and decided to send U-boats to raid American

commerce. They based these plans on hopes that the U.S. Navy would transfer ships to the Pacific. They might also buy time in the European war. What they did not know, however, was that it had already been decided with the British that if the United States entered the war, it would do so on a Europe-first strategic basis.

Even though the Mediterranean was a priority, Raeder sent six 500-ton submarines captained by “aces” to waters off the U.S. coast. Taking a month to deploy, by January an average of nineteen submarines operated in the U.S. Strategic Area on a daily basis. Their fuel capacity would allow them to operate in American waters for a two-week period. Each German submarine carried fourteen torpedoes and their deck guns were lethal enough to sink a ship by themselves. By the time the Germans arrived, U.S. forces had only been able to lay 365 mines off the Chesapeake Capes and submarine nets and booms off New York and other harbors. (New York was the busiest port in the world with an average of 50 arrivals and departures per day in November 1941.)

First blood was drawn on 12 January 1942 when the British passenger steamship, *Cyclops*, was sunk 300 miles off Cape Cod. In February, 432,000 tons of shipping went down in the Atlantic, 80 percent off the American coast. In March seventy ships were sunk along the coast. One of the factors that added to the casualty rate was that East Coast cities initially refused to dim their lights which silhouetted ships at night. Finally waterfront and sky signs were shut off on 18 April; a stricter order was imposed in May. Merchant ship captains sailing independently hugged the coastlines, believing the U-boats could not penetrate inshore which was not the case. In March, representatives of the petroleum industry met with Navy and War Department officers, warning them that if the rate of tanker sinkings were maintained, after nine months America's war-waging ability would be crippled due to lack of fuel oil. (They estimated a 40 percent further loss of ships and possibly the deaths of 3,000 more seamen.) The Germans proclaimed this period “the American hunting season.”

During this time, the U.S. government had its hands full supplying ships for two oceans. Moreover, initially, it responded ineffectively to the submarine threat. Adm. Ernest J. King, the new chief of naval operations, focused on the Pacific War and naval offensive strategy, and thought the submarine threat would soon diminish. Further, he lacked convoy escorts; officials would have staged maritime executions if they had bunched ships together without adequate protection. Moreover, King's dislike of the British was well-known in Washington and he received conflicting advice from the Royal Navy. However, Army General-in-Chief George C. Marshall was one of those who argued the importance of implementing defensive measures, as a result of his fear that he would lack transports to deploy troops overseas, which was a priority even at that early date. In May 1942, King finally ordered coastal convoying between Maine and Florida.

5.

Regardless of these problems, the coastal defense of merchant ships had to be provided for with a limited number of small military ships and acquired civilian vessels. In March, all Naval District Commanding Officers were ordered to “leave no stones unturned” in searching for vessels appropriate for antisubmarine work. In April, the number of vessels authorized for the Coast Guard Reserves was increased. By 1 April, the Eastern Sea Frontier Command had at its disposal sixty-five (75-90-foot) Coast Guard cutters, three 173-foot PC's, twelve Eagle boats and converted yachts and fourteen armed British trawlers. Eight-four Army planes and eighty-six Navy planes were flying out of nineteen bases. The Royal Navy also loaned the United States twenty-two converted trawlers whose crews had had substantial antisubmarine warfare experience.

Meanwhile other defensive measures were being implemented, the most important being the coastal convoy system. Army, Navy and Civil Air Patrol planes increased patrols. Because of the prevalence of night attacks, vessels were ordered to anchor overnight in the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and behind Cape Lookout in North Carolina. They were also routed through Long Island Sound and the Cape Cod Canal. Later Navy destroyers were assigned the near futile task of hunting the U-boats, as President Woodrow Wilson had described it in World War I, like chasing hornets around a barnyard. Although potential losses diminished as a result of these efforts, the cumulative total rose as spring foliage bloomed along the East Coast. In a case in point, only one member of the Chilean freighter, *Tolten*, survived a torpedoing thirty miles from the Ambrose Channel that leads into New York Harbor.

During this time the Coast Guard Auxiliary was performing important security and search and rescue duties, freeing up Coast Guard assets. In Massachusetts, Salem and Marblehead flotilla members conducted 12-hour winter patrols in an open unheated sea skiff. (XX:71) New Jersey flotillas checked “commercial fishing boats and their crews upon departure and arrival at docks in Wildwood, Two Mile, and Cape May to guard against their carrying supplies to enemy vessels off-shore or bringing enemy agents ashore. . . .” The Auxiliary's Cape Fear, North Carolina Division patrolled twenty-six inlets on a 24-hour basis, enduring the blazing hot sun during the day and sand flies and other insects at night. During the war, members rescued 300 persons from marshes and waters between Wilmington, North Carolina and Fernandina, Florida, most of whom were victims of plane crashes and small boat cases.

German tactics introduced in May presented new dangers to patrol boats. Eleven mine fields were laid by submarines off U.S. seaports which fortunately caused little damage (six ships were sunk or damaged, five in the channel approaching the Chesapeake Capes). Seven were discovered and swept up; the presence of the other four was not made known until the end of the war through German records. 6.

The increased effectiveness of defensive measures on the East Coast caused the Germans to concentrate off Florida and the Gulf of Mexico at the end of April where pickings were better. Six submarines began operating in the area. In May, forty-one ships were sunk of which 55 percent represented tanker tonnage. Two target-rich areas were the Florida Straits and the Passes in the Mississippi below New Orleans.

On 7 December 1941, William M. Mansfield, a noted Florida sportsman, reported to the Fort Lauderdale, Coast Guard Station and offered his services to the commanding officer. Within the next few months Mansfield used his considerable network of friends to enroll hundreds of boat owners in the Coast Guard Auxiliary. By September 1942, flotillas had sprung up in sixteen coastal cities. Members had offered 165 30-100-foot boats for use as operational facilities.

The area of the Florida Straits off the Cape Canaveral Lighthouse was a prime hunting ground for submarines, as it was lit, had a deep narrow shipping channel, and was fifty miles from the nearest small boat station. Small Auxiliary vessels patrolling offshore with no running lights risked being rammed by merchant ships that were also blacked out. Crews were in danger of being shot at by newly-trained naval gun crews then aboard merchant ships or mistaken for the enemy by the Coast Guard. On 28 April 1942, the District Director of the Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary reported that on 9 April orders had been issued to dispatch as many Auxiliary vessels as possible to the shipping lanes between St. Augustine and the Jupiter Light, 7:00 P.M. to sunrise, to look for distress signals and to rescue survivors. The report noted that given the dangers of mistaken identity, "The possibility of loss of Auxiliary personnel and boats on this patrol should be considered." It concluded that in the future it would be safer to station vessels close to the beaches. In this way they could be out of the shipping lanes, but be near enough to be able to respond to distress calls. On 5 May, the Commandant of the Coast Guard sent the following to the 7th District Commander: "In view of the heavy losses among personnel of torpedoed vessels along the coasts, the Commandant directs that immediate steps be taken to utilize vessels and members of the auxiliary to the fullest extent for the purpose of rescuing survivors."

In spite of hazards, during one 2-week period, Auxiliary crews rescued 151 survivors of submarine sinkings. The tanker, *Halsey*, was torpedoed just before dawn on 7 May. Coast Guard Auxiliary and commercial fishing vessels rescued 32 men. Also in May two Mexican tankers were sunk, a week apart. Members from three Auxiliary flotillas rescued 22 survivors from the *Petrero de Lano* that was engulfed in flames "while hundreds of civilians lined Miami Beach or watched [the rescue operation] from skyscraper hotel windows," as the ship was torpedoed a short distance from shore. The Auxiliarists "drove their little boats right into the flames" that had spread over the water

to take on the men. Active duty Coast Guard crews rescued 28 from the second Mexican ship. Auxiliarist Kit Johnson and crew rescued 22 merchant seamen from lifeboats off the SS *Java Arrow* that had been torpedoed on the night of 5 May. Johnson's overloaded boat was in a sinking condition when he brought it into the dock at the Fort Pierce Coast Guard Station.

In what was perhaps the largest Auxiliary/Reserve rescue of the war, on 8 July 1942, Dr. E. E. Kitchens and Mr. B. R. Smith, both members of Miami flotillas, were on vacation with their families in the Keys. The American tanker, *J. A. Moffett, Jr.*, was torpedoed eight miles off shore. Coast Guard boats were laid up with repairs, so Kitchens and Smith took the crews on board their two boats and left in heavy seas for the scene. Before they reached the tanker, survivors in two lifeboats were located. Kitchens took them on board and started to return to the station. Smith, with eleven survivors including the Chief Engineer, continued on to the tanker to try to find the captain, retrieve the ship's papers, and determine salvage needs. The captain was found dead, caught in the lifeboat falls. Meanwhile, Kitchens found sixteen more survivors and was now dangerously overloaded with at least thirty people on board. To return, he had to navigate without lights, in heavy seas, and through shallow channels. For his feat in bringing his boat and victims into port safely, Kitchens earned a commendation from the Commandant.

Willard Lewis became a local celebrity after he and crew members met up with a German submarine. While patrolling in a 38-foot cruiser off Ft. Lauderdale, Lewis was ordered to search for survivors of a tanker that had been torpedoed. Soon they came upon a U-boat whose diving fins had apparently been damaged by shots from the deck gun of the tanker; it was diving and surfacing repetitively. After it dove a second time and Lewis waited for it to resurface, he told his crew "the boys" back at the base would never believe that they had seen a sub. Suddenly with "crunching impact" the submarine surfaced under them, lifting the cruiser and tumbling Lewis and crew onto their deck. Lewis's boat limped back to the station with the paint marks of the U-boat as souvenirs and proof of their encounter.

Records state, "Time after time, these Auxiliarists took their tiny boats out, a few armed with rifles, others with boat hooks and flashlights, to haul drowning, burned, merchant seamen from the sea." Ultimately, the Coast Guard Auxiliary rescued more than 500 seamen from the sea during this dark period of the war.

Members also supplied vital local information and identified potential hiding places of submarines. At least four female temporary Reservists conducted patrols as operators and crew. In the case of Jean Linderman, the Coast Guard considered it too costly to train and house crews on her Florida Key, so they assigned her her own patrol

area of responsibility. In her finest hour, she led authorities to a military deserter who had been living on a local island. 7.

Early in 1942, the 7th District detailed the assignment of Coast Guard boats in the state. As an example at Key West there were: 2 examination vessels; 4 boats for convoy anchorage; 2 boats for carrying men and messages for convoys; 6 boats for harbor patrol; 6 boats for bridge patrols on keys; 1 fire boat.

By the end of May 1942, the German submarines had made their way into the Gulf of Mexico. Coast Guard commanders there had many fewer ships and aircraft to deal with the threat than had their counterparts on the East Coast. At the beginning of April, only three yachts, nine Coast Guard cutters, and two destroyers were available. Army and Navy planes patrolled from Miami and West Palm Beach air stations. During May and June an additional thirty-four cutters, patrol boats, and minesweepers, along with one converted yacht were added to the ASW fleet. As in the North, officers improvised. They changed shipping routes, concentrated search boats, and set up killer groups of ships and planes. More aircraft also became available.

The submarine situation in the Gulf was so severe that local Coast Guard officers did not wait for the establishment of operations on a national basis. The Auxiliary Coast Patrol was formed as a task group, headed by the commanding officer of the 8th District. Five bases were manned by Regulars, Auxiliarists, and Reservists. In Morgan City, Louisiana, in November 1942, the Patrol consisted of 137 boats, 126 of which were owned by shrimp fishermen. Allowances were made for their livelihoods, as they could fish at random and took turns manning their stations. These crews operated all over the Gulf and were furnished with guns and radios. They were ultimately responsible for saving the lives of many survivors of torpedo sinkings.

As an example of the Auxiliary's work in the Gulf, at 0210 EWT on 29 June 1942, the British tanker, SS *Empire Mica*, was torpedoed off Florida. It was enveloped in flames and the majority of its crew was trapped below decks. At 0540 when the Auxiliary vessel arrived, it found no survivors. It then received a call of a sighting of a life boat four miles to the northeast. CGAV *Countess* proceeded to the location and took the lifeboat with fourteen survivors in tow.

Taking note of the Auxiliary's work, at a Washington conference in May, it was decided that the Coast Guard was to provide additional coastal patrol craft. Admiral King directed the Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier to put out a call for boats which could remain seaworthy for forty-eight hours in good weather; these would constitute the Coastal Picket Force. The ESF Commander's order to the Districts stated:

The use of the Coast Guard Auxiliary vessels, operating from Coast Guard

Stations at various inlets along the Coast and patrolling inside and outside the shipping lanes, has already proven the feasibility of such a plan and warrants a much more extensive use of such vessels for rescues and observation purposes. A number of small yacht owners have signified their willingness to go to sea and, while cruising off shore, act as observation vessels.

All Commandants will therefore take steps to contact all yacht owners and, through the Coast Guard, after certification as to nationality, etc., get as many as possible of these craft at sea on observation duty. . . . Steps are to be taken also to induct into the Coast Guard Auxiliary service as many vessels as possible to act as rescue boats from Coast Guard Stations and as patrol boats for inside and outside sea lanes.

Aside from these measures, Washington hoped to replace lost ships. According to the *New York Times* in May, two armed merchant ships a day were coming off the production line. The government promised that by December this would be increased to three. 8.

The Coastal Picket Force

To meet the on-going crisis in June of 1942, transfers to and enrollment in the Coast Guard Reserve on a part-time or intermittent basis were authorized under an Amendment to the 1941 Auxiliary and Reserve Act. Thus, more Auxiliarists transferred into these units on a part-time or intermittent basis without military pay or on a full- or part-time basis with military pay. The age limits for the Reserve were 17 to 64 and the physical requirements were not strict. For the most part then, Auxiliarists who could not meet the physical requirements of the Reserve stayed in the Auxiliary and those who were physically fit transferred into the Reserve. By 30 June 1942, the Auxiliary had 11,500 members with 9,500 boats from 400 flotillas; 1,000 boats and most of their crews already had been taken into the Reserves.

Men and women--sometimes married--from all walks of life now flooded reserve units. Members included accountants, secretaries, doctors, janitors, teachers, construction workers. In one case a bank president stood watch with his clerk. Arthur Fiedler, conductor of the Boston Pops, joined, as did a former Governor of Maine. World War I veterans were represented in force. The Boston area distinguished itself by having the largest enrollment in the Auxiliary and, hence, as temporary Reservists. There were approximately 13,000 Auxiliary members. Of this number, nearly 10,000 enrolled as temporary members of the Reserves. Flotilla 201 of Portland, Maine had the largest number: 431, as of 1943. By the end of 1945, the 3rd Naval District in New York counted 11,318 members and 3,487 boats.

By July 1942, two developments spurred even greater organizational efforts. First was the unremitting toll on merchant shipping. In the Gulf, between 6 and 20 May of 1942, there were eighteen attacks on merchant vessels in which ten were sunk. In June, two teams of four German saboteurs each were landed on Long Island and near Jacksonville, Florida, from submarines. In reaction, enrollment in the Coast Guard Reserve on a full-time paid, but intermittent, basis was begun aggressively. In the same month, an integrated Army-Navy-Coast Guard "Sea Frontier" defense system was fully established that included beach, inshore, and offshore patrols; volunteer port security units; and a coastal picket force. (6:XVII:3-11; 6:XX:21, 24, 37) The system that was established was for Auxiliary and small Reserve vessels to do inshore and near offshore patrols and larger, seaworthy vessels of the Coastal Picket Force to conduct patrols along a 50-fathom curve of the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard, sometimes as far as 150 miles out to sea.

Both motor- and sailboats were used for the Coastal Picket Force. Boston Auxiliarists enrolled 60 sailboats and 40 motorboats in the CPF. In New York, a 7-member committee consisting of Coast Guard and Auxiliary officers and some of the premier names in American yachting, such as Charles F. Chapman, author of the classic, *Chapman Piloting*, worked at the New York Yacht Club for two months enrolling boats and crews. The two largest CPF bases in the New York region were at Greenport, Long Island and Manasquan, New Jersey. It appears that the Auxiliary's major role in the CPF was to enroll the vessels. However, a number of yachts and crews were manned by Auxiliarists who transferred into the Reserves. An "associate" membership category was created to accommodate those who were not boat owners and, thus, civilian crews flooded into units. 9.

The first Coastal Picket Force boat, *Two Pals*, left the Greenport base on 29 July 1942. Stations were assigned according to the Army's Interceptor Command system. This divided the U.S. littoral into 15 nautical-square-mile sectors and boats patrolled grid areas for specified periods of time. Crews were to "observe and report the actions and activities of all hostile submarine, surface and air forces."

From June until December 1942, many Reservists came into the CPF full-time with pay, serving one- to five-month periods. In the middle of December, the temporary members of the Reserves were given the choice of enrolling in the Reserves on a full-time paid basis, staying in as Reservists on a full or part-time basis without pay, or separating from the service.

By mid-September of 1942, 480 CPF vessels were working along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts out of more than thirty bases. By December, nationwide, there were 2,093

Reserve vessels. Together with Coast Guard craft (regular and acquired), the total number of vessels operating offshore was 3,256.

The large 50- to 100-foot sailboats were the signature vessels of the CPF. They became important assets for antisubmarine patrol, as they could hear submarines more easily than motorboats and the Germans could not hear them. In addition, they had longer cruising ranges and could take heavy weather better.

Members of the CPF at Greenport, Long Island lived up to their hardy sailor reputations. As the winter of 1942 approached, the Coast Guard wanted to transfer many of the boats south, because of the particularly severe weather conditions. The members, however, pleaded to stay in operation, saying they thought they could “take it.” As a result, the group sustained operations during the winter in all but the most severe weather conditions.

In December of 1942, Adm. Adolphus Andrews, commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, sent the following (excerpted) letter to all task group commanders. He ordered that the letter be posted at all coastal picket stations:

'On three recent occasions coastal picket vessels have been caught offshore by sudden winter gales. Certain of these vessels have been severely punished by the elements and faced conditions which made it impossible even to maintain fires in their stoves for cooking or for heating. . . . One picket boat with all hands busily engaged in an effort to keep afloat in the high seas, had an additional task of extinguishing a fire which broke out in the engine room. Another boat, after battling head winds and high seas for a day and a night, exhausted its fuel supply. In consequence of the excellent seamanship displayed by the commanding officer of this boat, and of the assisting boat, fuel was transferred at sea under the existing difficult conditions. . . . In spite of the discomfort and danger connected with their tasks, it is noted that those men who have undergone these experiences are uniformly anxious to refit as expeditiously as possible, and return to their patrols. Such morale on the part of the coastal picket men is commendable in the highest degree.

To effect their anti-submarine work, CGR vessels were armed with four 300-pound depth charges, one (usually .50 caliber) machine gun, and a radio. The key to this work was to man the listening devices and keep contact with and track the submarine. 'Often other vessels were sent to pick up contact, and if the source were located the area was 'developed'. If vessels with heavier armament took up the search, the Coastal Pickets resumed their patrols.' Planes might be sent to investigate. Navy vessels and convoys were informed of the contacts. As long as the small boats could keep the submarines submerged, the probability of sinkings lessened. Due to the necessity for greater speed, the German submarines tracked the convoys and usually attacked surfaced, and at night.

The doctrine for the CPF was very clear and worth quoting at length:

'It may be assumed that enemy action will take one of the following forms:

- (a) Submarine activity against shipping
- (b) Aircraft attack on New York vicinity
- (c) Surface craft employed as raiders or scouts
- (d) Attempts to land ground forces
- (e) The laying of mines in coastal waters by submarine, surface vessels, or aircraft
- (f) Bombardment of shore objectives by submarine or surface vessels.

Therefore the mission of the CPF boats was fourfold: a) report instantly b) maintain observation c) attack when armament permitted and d) report distress of U.S. forces and assist. Orders emphasized that protection could only be afforded if convoys were adequately warned. Therefore, crews must be constantly alert and their radios had to be in good working order, Further:

Contact with the enemy having been established by sight or sound will not be broken as long as it is possible to maintain it. . . .This may mean certain destruction of a picket boat but may save a convoy. Men in the old Life Saving Service confronted with the necessity of launching through a dangerous surf had a slogan which seems applicable also to the Pickets, 'You have to go out, but the Regulations don't say you have to come back. . . .

The performance of the third part of the mission is simple. If you have 'cans' [depth charges] use them. Your Lewis guns are not able to compete with the 9" or even the 20 millimeter guns of the enemy but by vigorously rushing him you may prevent him from manning these guns and may thus force him to submerge.'

Aside from the submarine work, the Picket Force's other main duty was search and rescue of survivors of torpedoed vessels and of other distress cases. They also were

responsible for recording sightings, unidentified sounds and significant flotsam and jetsam.

As an example of a CPF case, on 17 May 1942, the English vessel, *Peisander*, was torpedoed 300 miles off Bermuda and three lifeboats were launched. The CGC *General Greene* received orders to join the search on 24 May. In the meantime, lifeboats 4 and 6 (22 and 21 survivors respectively) were located and towed in by CGR-37 and a CG lifeboat from Maddaket Station. On 25 May, *Greene* departed Nantucket with two CG reserve vessels in search of the third lifeboat. At 0945 hours, it sighted it and a sub as well. It swung its bow around to try to ram the submarine, but the U-boat dove. *Greene* dropped three depth charges and an oil slick 400 feet in diameter appeared and no sound contact was made for the next twenty-five minutes. The *Greene* then took on board the eighteen survivors from the lifeboat and they explained that the submarine had been trailing them. When the SS *Plow City* had attempted a rescue four days before, it was torpedoed (thirty crew members of the *Plow City* were picked up five days later). At 1601 hours the CGC *Greene* arrived in Nantucket and all the survivors from the three lifeboats were taken to Newport, Rhode Island.

In another incident on 19 September 1942, in the 4th ND, a Civil Air Patrol (CAP) plane spotted a submarine and dropped a smoke bomb to identify its position. The smoke was seen by CGR-4436 which proceeded to the sighting at full speed. The plane dropped another smoke bomb off its bow. The CGRV dropped a depth charge which resulted in the eruption of a large column of water with black oil. By the time the submarine was attacked, five CAP planes, four Navy planes, one Navy blimp, and two Navy vessels had joined in on the case.

The case of the CGR 3070, a.k.a., *Zaida*, became legendary. In December 1942 as it was ending its week-long patrol, the 58-foot yawl with her crew of nine nearly rolled on its beam in gale force winds that snapped the mizzen mast and caused other damage. Skipper Curtis Arnall, one of the radio voices of comic book hero, Buck Rogers, was able to send a distress message. Then he headed the boat southwest, running sometimes with winds so strong that they sailed barepoled. Over the course of the next twenty days, more than twenty-five planes and ships of the U.S. Army and Canadian Air Forces, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. and British navies searched for the sturdy craft. During this time, all the while experiencing a number of wrenching failed rescue attempts, *Zaida* sailed 3,100 miles from off Nantucket Shoals to Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina. Finally the boat was sighted fifteen miles from shore by a blimp and was taken in tow by a Coast Guard cutter. The hunt for *Zaida* constituted the largest search and rescue operation in the Atlantic by Allied Forces during World War II.

A significant duty of CPF vessels was to record critical incidents and sightings. Vessel logs recorded: sightings of submarines, aircraft, unidentified vessels, fishermen and lifeboats; floating drums, mines, loose buoys, and targets; gunshots and explosions heard; oil slicks discovered and oil samples taken for analysis; towing and other SAR cases. CGR-3065 even recorded the landing of a homing pigeon with an injured leg. 10.

Port Security

During the war, thousands of Auxiliarists, serving as Reservists, also performed port security duties. Uniquely in the First and Third Districts, the Auxiliary (as temporary members of the Reserve) was solely responsible for port security. Commands known as Volunteer Port Security Force Units were organized in twenty-two port cities as temporary Reserve units. Although most other Auxiliary/TR units operated separately, VPSF units were enrolled from the Auxiliary in southern California, the upper Midwest (9th ND), and in the Northwest (13th ND). Los Angeles and Long Beach California Auxiliarists held dual titles as members of the Auxiliary and the local VPSF Unit. In other cities, Auxiliary/TR units afloat cooperated with VPSF ones.

Prior to and during World War II new regulations, laws, and amendments increased the Coast Guard's enforcement powers in harbors and at waterfront facilities. Following the 1939 Neutrality Proclamation, the Coast Guard was charged with sealing ships' radios to prevent communication with the enemy. Ships were checked to make sure armaments were not being brought into ports. Anchorage regulations were revised and the Dangerous Cargo Act of 1940 was passed. Explosive regulations were implemented in April 1941. In June 1942, all port security responsibilities were delegated to the Coast Guard.

Port security duties included: controlling entrance, movement, and anchorage of vessels; fire prevention and fighting; supervision of loading and storage of ammunition and explosives; sealing ships' radios; guarding piers, stored cargo, docked ships, and harbor areas; licensing of commercial vessels operating in local waters; issuance and checking of identification cards for access to waterfront facilities and for recreational vessels; enforcing regulations pertaining to use of cameras and binoculars. Because of the voluminous amounts of ammunition being shipped, fire prevention and detection (particularly because the dangers of smoking and of cutting and welding in repair facilities) was a primary duty. German sabotage was also a concern. The 1942 burning of the French liner, *Normandie*, that was being converted to a troop transport, moved the Coast Guard to augment cities' fireboat fleets by converting 150 small craft--tugs, luggers, tourist, fishing vessels--to fireboats. The service also built 103 30-foot Harvey boats that were equipped with four 500-gallon-a-minute fire pumps. Temporary Reservists manned fireboats in Portland, Maine; Providence, Rhode Island; Washington,

D.C.; Cleveland, Ohio; and Galveston, Texas. Units at St. Paul, Minnesota; Rock Island, Illinois; and Memphis, Tennessee were manned entirely by “TRs,” as they were popularly known.

Beating their dockside and ship posts TRs detained, interrogated, and arrested persons; detected and extinguished ship and pier fires; thwarted incidents of theft and assaults; assisted at large fires, medical emergencies, drownings and during storms; and enforced laws and regulations. Munition ship security details consisted of men at each hold; one on the weather decks; one for the gangway; and several on the piers. As an example of the work of the port security units, the Los Angeles Auxiliary/VPSF unit at its peak comprised 2,400 members, including 175 women. Members served as “commercial fishing boat inspectors, fire watchers, guards and sentries at docks and piers, in the ID office, and on transportation and radio watches, as well as on duty in vessels at piers.” Farragut Flotilla No. 25 Reservists from Camden, New Jersey saved twenty-four women and children from drowning on 19 August 1944 when the gangway of the steamer, *State of Pennsylvania*, collapsed while taking on passengers (a 12-year-old boy drowned and an elderly woman later died of a heart attack.) (Camden:45; XX:60-61) During the war, the port of Philadelphia that was manned by TRs in abundance, handled 100 million tons of shipping, yet there were no cases of uncontrolled fires or sabotage.

More than 2,000 women also served as temporary Reservists in VPSF units. In some Districts they received the same training as the men, including small arms training. They checked ID's in security booths, performed administrative duties, and served as drivers, messengers, and auto mechanics.

Nationwide Auxiliary/Reserve members were less active in beach patrols that included foot, canine, and mounted patrols; these were mostly conducted by active duty Coastguardsmen. Yet in Florida and other Districts, members stood lookout in watchtowers on beaches. In Panama City, Maj. Frank Wood's, USA (ret.), flotilla members also served in mounted units, as well as on every other type of patrol. New England members were extensively used on beach patrols, pounding lonely beaches on hot summer days and cold winter nights, often accompanied by trained dogs. A member of Flotilla 600 in Duxbury, Massachusetts on Cape Cod reported: “The beach itself is annoying rather than dangerous. During most of the year it is covered with round, slippery rocks concealed by slimy kelp; it is strewn with lobster-pots, barrels, ships' fenders, water-logged mattresses, flotsam, jetsam, and just plain skudge.” Approximately 15 percent of TRs on Lake Michigan stood lookout in lifeboat stations. Sightings included submarines, flares, suspicious lights, and unlit vessels. Beach patrols members saved people from drowning. During the worst of the submarine warfare in the spring of 1942, Daytona Beach Flotilla members located bodies during their rounds. 11.

Land and dock patrols were conducted by a mix of active duty members and temporary Reservists. Regarding harbor and inshore patrols, however, “Virtually all duty by Temporary Reservists enrolled by the Auxiliary was, in the earlier days, confined to the operation of patrol craft. . . . Uniforms were not issued until July 1942 and given the large influx of new members during the first months of the war, often men went on duty without proper uniforms. As one commented, “It is a wonder that a lot of us were not shot by men in the boats we stopped and boarded thinking we were enemies bent on sabotage or piracy.” In Booth Bay Harbor, Maine, Fuller Dunton and Cliff Huskins conducted two 12-hour night inlet patrols a week, after which they reported to their regular jobs in the morning.

The duties of harbor, inlet, and river patrol members were to constantly watch for fires and unauthorized craft with no or improper identification; report unidentified vessels; report and clear navigation and seaplane landing hazards; report aids to navigation that were off station; maintain a lookout for accidents and assist with search and rescue; assist at boat fires, drownings, and plane crashes; salvage planes and boats; and recover bodies.

A great number of landing craft, ranging from small infantry barges to large landing ships, transited south down the Mississippi River and its tributaries from Midwest factories during the war. Reservists were out in force on the rivers, serving as picket boats for this line of sail. Because of the need for local river knowledge, given the changing channels and strong currents, to say nothing of islands and debris, in some cases Reservists went on board Navy ships to act as advisory pilots.

Especially in the early days, most flotillas conducted their own training. Later specialized schools were established in some locales such as the Auxiliary “boot camp” in Bourne, Massachusetts. Members were also sent for Coast Guard training in such specialties as firearms and firefighting. Aside from the typical nautical topics of rules of the road, boat and line handling, aids to navigation and piloting, members were trained in such topics as military ranks, ratings, courtesy and customs; loading explosives; chemical warfare; first aid; radio communications; motor mechanics; blinker and semaphore communication. In many locales a combination of written and oral examinations qualified members.

The TR patrols compiled a staggering list of accomplishments. Three hundred TRs patrolled the lakes of the Tennessee River Valley Authority. In New Haven harbor, Yale undergraduates crewed two 6-hour night shifts seven days a week. Enthusiasm was so high that the reserve list totaled sixty men. On 19 August 1943, men were underway in fifteen minutes after having been called from their jobs in Middletown, Connecticut.

The crew reached the scene of a plane crash five miles off shore in thirty-five minutes. The body of the pilot was recovered by TRs after a two-day search by several agencies. A tugboat exploded in Port Angeles, Washington. TRs were first on the scene and to apply water to the fire; they saved the master who had been blown overboard; and stood by to render additional assistance.

On 3 January 1944, at 0640 a series of explosions shook the USS *Turner* a destroyer anchored approximately three miles from the Ambrose Lightship off New York City. Among other Coast Guard and Navy assets, twelve boats, partly manned by Reservists, were dispatched from Rockaway and Sandy Hook Lifeboat Stations reaching the disaster area between 0730 and 0755. CGR-1904 alone evacuated 39 survivors. Of the 156 survivors, 160 were taken off by the Coast Guard “in accordance with the traditions of the service.”

Natural disasters have always provided the Auxiliary opportunities to conduct dramatic rescues. The same was true during wartime. During a “big blow” in Bellingham, Washington on 15 January 1945:

Two-thirds of the TRs turned out for night-long special duty to save dozens of families from hunger and discomfort, and many craft from destruction. They protected small boats from damage by 30-foot logs broken loose from a boom which were sweeping about the harbor like battering rams. Later, a TR-manned Coast Guard vessel, hampered by high seas and heavy icing, provided food and livestock feed for 15 families in isolated inlets.

During the May-June 1943 disastrous Mississippi floods during which more than 6,000 families were affected or made homeless by 15- to 20-foot waters, 250 TRs assisted. Coast Guard members helped rescue 7,000 head of cattle, 17,000 hogs, 600 horses, 900 mules, and 20,000 poultry. Only six human lives were lost. 12.

As the submarine threat diminished after March 1943 and the need for overseas deployment increased, the roles of the Auxiliary and temporary Reservists shifted. From May 1943 on, Auxiliary efforts became directed at training men for active duty in the Reserves. By the end of 1943 most water patrols had ended and units were shifted to perform shore duties.

“You’re in the Army Now!”

After the attack on Pearl Harbor that ushered America into the war, U.S. officials looked west to America’s Pacific possessions and allies that were seriously threatened by the Japanese military machine. During the 1930s two brothers from Long Island, A. Bruce and J. Sheridan Fahnestock, along with their mother and friends, had conducted two

highly publicized South Sea exploring expeditions sponsored by the American Museum of Natural History and other institutions. The Fahnestock family were also personal friends of President Roosevelt. As a result of their sailing experience, the Fahnestocks became impressed with the need to establish a small boat fleet if America became involved in the war. The southwest Pacific was riddled with islands and reefs that would make invasions difficult and afford little maneuverability for battleships, aircraft carriers, and other large warships. Thus in December 1941, "Mission X" staff consisting of the Fahnestock brothers, exploring crew members, and other analysts met in Washington to develop a plan to relieve the Philippines. However, given the swiftness of Japanese advances, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall saw that the real priority was to save Australia. After he evacuated to Australia from the Philippines in March, Gen. Douglas MacArthur determined that New Guinea would be its defensive line. In July 1942, Japanese forces invaded the north coast of New Guinea at Buna and other points. MacArthur spent the next two years retaking the inhospitable island.

In the spring of 1942, the Fahnestocks and others who had been commissioned as army officers arrived in Australia to cobble together a small boat fleet under the terms of a reverse lend-lease agreement. This motley assortment included ferries, fishing trawlers, coastal traders, pearl luggers, and more. It became known as "MacArthur's Navy." In November, the first invasion along the north shore of New Guinea at Pongani was headed by the Fahnestocks in their small boat fleet. Over the next few years, this force would serve as the major life line for MacArthur's forces on the island. These craft brought in everything from canned and powered food, to ammunition, to airstrip matting, to medical supplies. Crews also evacuated the sick, wounded, and dead.

Yet by the spring and summer of 1943, the Army was becoming increasingly short of not only boats, but crews, to supply MacArthur. Hence U.S. boatmen and mariners were recruited as civilian contract employees in the Army's Small Ships Branch of its Transportation Corps. Although the precise number is unknown, many Auxiliarists signed up for this duty. Edwin Dennis and five other members of their Queens, New York flotilla enrolled in the fall. Three weeks after his visit to an Army Brooklyn recruiting station and testing in California, Dennis found himself in New Guinea. He became the deck engineer on the *Jane Moorehead*, an 1885 72-foot ketch that had been brought into service as part of the Fahnestock fleet. It was equipped with two .50 caliber machine guns and had no electricity, refrigeration, or toilet facilities. Their boat ferried supplies up and down the New Guinea coast and into combat areas. As Dennis remarked, "If you could handle a small boat and you didn't mind going into a combat zone in a virtually unarmed vessel, you were signed on." Dennis later was transferred to a medical evacuation ship. In total approximately 1,300 Auxiliarists and other American mariners served in the Army's navy during the war in the Pacific. 13.

Above and Beyond Their Regular Duties

The above catalogues only some of the highlights of maritime service contributed by members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve during the war. However, their ancillary work demonstrated an even more impressive record. A few units established medical units: three completely equipped medical ships in the Seattle area; a floating hospital off Miami. A home economist established a small-boat cooking school in Seattle. In the 4th Naval District, men procured and trained dogs. More common corollary duties included as radiomen, plumbers, carpenters, electricians, mechanics, painters, metalsmiths and more. Most units published their own newsletters, directives, and magazines; many District ones are still in print. The Third District established the Auxiliary press that published training manuals and news publications for the whole country. In a typical month, it completed 500,000 impressions. Members sold millions of dollars worth of war bonds, and bought them as well. The Auxiliary fielded a number of bands. The Cleveland one as awarded a distinguished service citation by the Music War Council. San Francisco Auxiliarists raised \$437,000 in war bonds in 1944 and fielded a 35-piece band. As was the case with other citizens, blood-giving became a habit. Among Auxiliarists there was a "two-gallon" club. In 1944, Temps conducted a recruiting drive for CG Women Reservists, known as SPARs, and active duty Reservists. Throughout the Auxiliary's existence, fellowship, has been a major cornerstone, so social activities such as dinners, dances, and clambakes, were organized that included the participation of active duty personnel. 14. (XX: 100-104)

Casualties

It must also be noted that 137 of these men and women Reservists died while in active service during the war, relatively, a large number for homeland duty. A number of deaths resulted from pneumonia and heart attacks, no doubt due to winter patrols in open boats and the more advanced ages of the reservists. A significant number also sustained injuries: falls on docks and off decks, in car accidents, burns, slips on ice, etc. 15.

Conclusion

So what is the historical significance of these 50,000 Auxiliarist and 50,000 temporary Reservists who played an extraordinary role in homeland defense during the war? Most obviously their importance was the number of Coastguardsmen they released for duty overseas. During the war, the Coast Guard manned 349 Navy vessels, 291 Army vessels, and 762 Coast Guard vessels (65-foot or longer) totaling 1,404 large craft. Given that most reservists volunteered 24 hours per week, a full-time equivalent has been estimated to be a ratio of 6 TRs for each active duty member released. The official number of Coast Guardsmen, thus, released for overseas duty is estimated at 8,250. Also at the end

of 1944 the Auxiliary's air wing which supports Coast Guard air operations had just been formed. Further, during the week large numbers of these volunteers were employed in wartime business. Because of their civilian training, they often brought extra skills to the Coast Guard. Their ancillary duties were also largely undertaken on their own initiative. Given this addition of skill and time, one must consider that their volunteer time was more valuable than if one new active duty recruit had replaced a Coastguardsmen deployed overseas.

Two other factors stand out in viewing the Coast Guard Auxiliary's record of service during World War II: the volunteer and maritime traditions in America. To many Americans the images of minute men and militias might seem to be quaint, candy caricatures learned in elementary school. The power of their real existence should not be underestimated, however. Militia proved their worth at Lexington and Concord and their presence was pivotal at the Battle of Saratoga during the Revolutionary War. America is the only nation whose society and government were built from the bottom up. Each frontier community largely was responsible for itself. Our Constitution declares that sovereignty resides with the people. One of the major reasons for the American Revolution was that the British government tried to impose an imperial government upon an already well-developed political entity. This fact, enforced by religious and political ideals and laws, has given Americans a sense of "ownership" of their government that, this author believes, is unique in the world. The spirit of volunteerism in America stems in good part from this sense of ownership and fact of societal development. The Coast Guard Auxiliary is just one shining example of this tradition.

Finally, there is an appeal in the maritime tradition that has few equals. As a boater stated to a *Time* magazine reporter in 1959, "Out there. . . a man's a boy and a boy's a man. When you're out of sight of land, life loses its complexity; it's just you and the sea, and suddenly north is important to you." And so we have seen that during World War II, bank presidents stood watch with their clerks. Orchestra conductors crewed with janitors. Both had to be clear about where north was and be responsible for each other. Moreover, all made meaningful contributions to the war effort whether it was checking identification cards, discovering a fire, rescuing a drowning victim, or depth charging a submarine. Today, a few World War II Auxiliarists are still members. There are many actively serving World War II veterans. This author believes it was and is the meaningful work and the maritime egalitarian traditions of shared knowledge, competency, and responsibility that created such a powerful, vibrant organization during the years of World War II and that continues to this day. The Coast Guard Auxiliary motto is a fitting one: "A Proud Tradition, A Worthy Mission." 16.

Notes

1. N. A., *History of American Yachts and Yachting* (New York: Spirit of the Times, 1901), p. 5; C. Kay Larson, "When North Becomes Important: The History of Pleasure Boating in America, 1825-1997", unpublished paper prepared for Coast Guard Auxiliary 60th Anniversary Exhibit, "The Rise of Pleasure Boating and the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary," April-November 1999, Coast Guard Academy Museum, New London, Conn., pp. 1-10; Phone interview, 18 November 2002, Coast Guard Historian, Washington, D. C.; Paul E. Shanabrook, *The Boston: A History of the Boston Yacht Club, 1866-1979* (Boston: The Boston Yacht Club, 1979), pp. 78-81; U. S., *Statutes-at-Large*, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 417, 1916, pp. 587-88.

2. U.S., *Statutes-at-Large*, 76th Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 243, 23 June 1939, p. 854; U.S. Coast Guard, Public Relations Division, *The Coast Guard at War. Auxiliary*, Vol. XIX (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Coast Guard, May 1, 1948), pp. 1-6; U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, *Auxiliary Membership Qualification Guide* (CG-302) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Coast Guard, 1967), pp. 97-99; Larson, *History of Pleasure Boating*, pp. 24-25; U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, "A Seagoing 25th Anniversary for the Auxiliary", reprint from June 1964 issue of *Motorboating*, p. 3; "With the Coast Guard Auxiliary," *Yachting*, March 1943; U.S., *Statutes-at-Large*, 77th Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 8, 19 February 1941, p. 9.

3. Auxiliary, *Membership Qualification Guide*, pp. 97-99; Coast Guard, *At War*, XIX, pp. 14; U.S. Coast Guard, Public Relations Division, *The Coast Guard at War: Temporary Reserve*, Vol. XX (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Coast Guard, January 1, 1948), p. 13; U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary. *The Volunteers: The Story of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary National Board, Inc., 1986), p. 1; Hickman Powell, "A Small-Boat Navy", *Popular Science*, September 1941, pp. 76-78; *New York Times*, 17 August 1941, p. 18; "With the Coast Guard Auxiliary," *Yachting*, March 1943.

4. Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II; Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-43* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1988), pp. 63-64, 84-85, xii; Hickman, *Small-Boat Navy*, pp. 78-79; Auxiliary, *Membership Qualification Guide*, pp. 97-100.

5. United States of America, World War II 50th Anniversary Commemoration Committee, Fact Sheet: Pearl Harbor (Washington, D. C.: n.p., n.d.); Coast Robert Erwin Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 223; John A. Tilley, Chapter II: "The Auxiliary at War: 1941-1945" unpublished manuscript, history of the U. S. Coast Guard, Office of the Chief Director of Auxiliary, Washington, D. C., pp. 1-2;

U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, 13th Naval District, *Norwester*, Annual Edition, 1945 (Seattle, Wash.: U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, 13th Naval District, 1945), p. 48; William T. Pickering, "The Auxiliary Comes of Age," *Yachting*, November 1942, p. 24; Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 63-64, 84-85, 125-30; Director, Coast Guard Reserve & Auxiliary to District Coast Guard Office, 7th Naval District, 28 April 1942, General Correspondence, 7th Naval District, Record Group 26, National Archives, Washington, D. C., pp. 3-4; *New York Times*, 14 May 1942, p. 3; James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 119-30; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, p. 1; Michael Gannon, *Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of German's First U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 266, 342-43; Kathleen Broome Williams, *Secret Weapon: U.S. High-Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp. 14, 144-46 and phone interview 17 November 2002; C. Kay Larson, *'Til I Come Marching Home: A Brief History of American Women in World War II* (Pasadena, Md.: Minerva Press, 1995), pp. xiv, 18.

6. Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 131-37; *New York Times*, 14 May 1942; Stokesbury, *Short History*, pp. 130; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 3-4, 21, 71; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XIX, p. 12; U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, Flotilla 81 [CGD1(SR)], "A Short History of the Events Leading to the Establishment of the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary," unpublished paper assembled by Warren E. Fox on the occasion of our 40th Anniversary Boatmen's Banquet, Ocean City Yacht Club, 1980, pp. 5-6.

7. U.S. Coast Guard Historical Section, Public Information Division, *Coast Guard at War*, Vol. XIV, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, January 1, 1947), pp. 13-14; Roddy Johnson, *Different Battles: The Search for a World War II Hero* (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1999), pp. 92-99; Director, Coast Guard Reserve & Auxiliary to District Coast Guard Office, 7th Naval District, 28 April 1942, General Corresp., RG26, NARA; Commandant to District Coast Guard Officer, 7th Naval District, 2 May 1942, General Corresp., RG26, NARA; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 12, 87; *Miami Herald*, 3 August 1945, p. 4A; William B. Mellor, Jr., *Sank Same* (New York: Howell, Soskin, 1944), pp. 150, 161-62; Auxiliary, 13th ND, *Norwester*, p. 121; C. Kay Larson, "Betty Wood McNabb, 1906-1996: Legendary Auxiliarist and Female Pilot" *Navigator*, Summer 1997, pp. 27-82; U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, 5th Naval District, "CGA 6th Anniversary, 7th District", *Ahoy*, special issue, June 1945, pp. 71-72, photo: Linderman; Commandant to Coast Guard District Officer, 7th District, 25 June 1942, General Correspondence, Record Group 26, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

8. Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 132-43; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 21, 42; C. Kay Larson, "The Coast Guard Auxiliary in World War II," unpublished paper prepared for WWII commemoration, First Coast Guard District, Southern Region, 1994, p. 6; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XIV, pt. 2, p. 47; Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier to Commandants, First to Seventh Naval Districts, 29 May 1942, General Corresp., RG26, NARA; Johnson, *Guardians*, p. 207; *New York Times*, 14 May 1942, p. 4, 2 December 1942, p. 4; Stokesbury, *Short History*, p. 130.
9. Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XIX, p. 8; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 3, 21, 24, 27, 37; U.S. Coast Guard, Public Relations Division. *The Coast Guard at War: Beach Patrol*, Vol. XVII (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Coast Guard, May 15, 1945), pp. 3-11; U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, 25th Anniversary, *Motorboating* reprint; Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 136-37; Tilley, 1941-1945, p. 15; Johnson, *Guardians*, pp. 203-05.
10. Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 23, 25, 27, 32-33; Buck Rogers website, www.buck-rogers.com; Williams, *Secret Weapon*, pp. 3-20, 62; Auxiliary, *Membership Qualification Guide*, p. 104; Larson, Auxiliary in World War II, pp. 11-12; U.S. Coast Guard Historical Section, Public Information Division, *Coast Guard at War*, Vol. XIV (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, January 1, 1947), pp. 14-15.
11. Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 4-5, 19, 60-61, 65-70, 76; U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, 11th Naval District, *The Standby*, October 1944, masthead listing of officers; Robert M. Browning, Jr., "Captains of the Port" (http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/h_cptprt.html); John T. Dwyer, *Wartime History, 1942-1945 of Farragut Flotilla No. 25*, Camden, New Jersey, photocopy, 1945, pp. 45; Director, Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary, 7th District, 28 April 1942, General Corresp., RG26, NARA, p. 4.
12. Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 69-93; "With the Coast Guard Auxiliary," *Yachting*, November 1942, p. 24, December 1942, p. 50; U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, *A Proud Tradition, A Worthy Mission: The Coast Guard Auxiliary, 1939-1999*, video, Auxiliary National Board, Inc., St. Louis, Mo.; Larson, Auxiliary in World War II, p. 5; Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XIV, pt. 2, pp. 68-74
13. [C.] Kay Larson, "MacArthur's Navy" *Coast Guard*, December 199, pp. 54-57.
14. Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 100-04.
15. Coast Guard, *At War*, Vol. XX, pp. 122-23.
16. United States of America, World War II 50th Anniversary Commemoration Committee, Fact Sheet: U.S. Coast Guard (Washington, D. C.: n.p., n.d.); Coast Guard,

At War, Vol. XX, p. 117; Pickering, "Comes of Age," p. 62; Milestone Chart, History Division, U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary; Larson, "History of Pleasure Boating," pp. 1-26, 32; Benson Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution* (New York: Penguin Putman, 1997), pp. 75-76, 119, 256.

United States Coast Guard Auxiliary

Maritime Domain Awareness



2005 - 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	WHAT IS MDA	1
III.	THE ROLE OF THE AUXILIARY	3
	Safety	3
	Security	4
IV.	AUXILIARY MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY STRATEGY	5
	Awareness	6
	Prevention	7
	Protection	7
	Response	7
	MDA Implementation – OPR III	8
V.	SUMMARY	9
	Appendix A: Operation Patriot Readiness III (OPR III)	10
	Appendix B: Excerpt from USCG White Paper on MDA	14

I. INTRODUCTION

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is an evolving concept that has emerged as the United States seeks to improve the safety and security of its citizens in the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 (9/11). This document provides additional information on the United States Coast Guard's response to these events and the potential contribution of the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary to MDA.

The President set the tone (“*We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.*”) and the direction of America's fight on terrorism. His key thrust is clearly “preemption.” Since 9/11, the federal government has been undergoing a massive reorganization and transformation to meet this challenge. Our world and the way we operate in it have forever changed. It is the policy of the United States to strike at the terrorists where they live and, at the same time, take all necessary measures to protect the homeland.

While many actions have been taken, both foreign and internal, the one with greatest impact on the USCG and the Auxiliary is the creation of the *Department of Homeland Security* (DHS) and the inclusion of the Coast Guard in this department. Since the department was established, the USCG has become engaged in an overarching transformation in which MDA issues have become a vital component of all Coast Guard missions, both operations and support. The challenge to secure U.S. transportation systems and borders is substantial—there are 5,525 miles of border with Canada, 1,989 miles with Mexico, as well as a maritime border that includes 95,000 miles of shoreline, 350 official ports of entry, and 3.4 million square miles of exclusive economic zone.

The Auxiliary, a key component of Coast Guard forces, is involved in this transformation and is fully aligned with the Active Duty component. To better understand what the Coast Guard is doing concerning MDA, the letter of promulgation and executive summary (reproduced from a Coast Guard white paper on MDA) provide an excellent broad overview of Coast Guard aims and directions. This paper is provided in Appendix B and is briefly summarized below.

II. WHAT IS MDA?

In December 2002, the Coast Guard published its “Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,” which established key objectives and means to achieve them to mitigate the risks associated with threats to our Nation's maritime security and to prevent terrorist attacks.¹ The primary components of this strategy include awareness of threats and vulnerabilities, prevention and protection against these threats, and response to potential attacks.

¹ This document is available electronically at the following address;
http://www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/Maritime_strategy/USCG_Maritime_Strategy.pdf

Awareness is clearly a key component, because the success of prevention, protection, and response clearly requires awareness. **Maritime Domain Awareness is defined as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States.”**²

MDA requires both a process and an infrastructure. The process consists of

- (1) collecting maritime data, information, and intelligence,
- (2) collating, correlating, analyzing, and interpreting the collected material,
- (3) providing effective assessment, actionable intelligence, and relevant knowledge, and
- (4) disseminating actionable intelligence to appropriate federal, state, local, private, and international stakeholders.

Enhanced MDA will result by leveraging the building on existing and far-ranging capabilities—including the disciplines of *Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance* (C4ISR). It will clearly require unprecedented information sharing at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as with international partners. As the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, the Coast Guard has the primary responsibility within DHS to protect the U.S. maritime domain and maritime transportation system and deny their use and exploitation by terrorists. The Coast Guard also safeguards the homeland against a broad array of other maritime-related threats, including drug smuggling, illegal migration, organized crime, resource exploitation, danger to those conducting commerce and other legitimate maritime operations, the spread of infectious diseases, and environmental degradation. MDA supports all Coast Guard missions essential to security and safety.

As noted by Mr. Jeffrey P. High, Director of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Domain Awareness Program Integration Office, in recent congressional testimony, “Comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain involves specific knowledge of vessels, generic port infrastructures, transshipment facilities, maritime approaches, waterways, anchorages, fishing grounds, rookeries, choke-points, shipping lanes, and transit corridors, as well as a diverse array of critical infrastructure—from offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico to the Statue of Liberty. This awareness must become increasingly comprehensive as potential threats approach the U.S. coast, ports, and inland waterways. We must know what is ‘normal’ and what is ‘not normal’ throughout the marine transportation system and maritime domain—from the inland waterways and ports to the high seas—so we can best assess potential risks.”

² This definition was presented by Mr. Jeffrey P. High, Director of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Domain Awareness Program Integration Office, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives on 6 October 2004. This testimony is available electronically at <http://www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/10-06-04/10-06-04memo.html>.

III. THE ROLE OF THE AUXILIARY

The Letter of Promulgation and the Executive Summary (reproduced in Appendix B) spell out the Coast Guard's two overriding missions of safety and security. Every operational and support function in the Coast Guard bears on these two missions — **as it does with the Auxiliary**. The Auxiliary's key mission is to assist the Coast Guard in the performance of its safety and security missions. The Coast Guard has set the strategy for all of its components (Active Duty, Reserve, and Auxiliary). The Auxiliary must devise and execute supporting strategies, operations, and tactics.

While MDA directly positions the Auxiliary to become a major support force in both safety and security roles, MDA encompasses more than security. Post-9/11 security is a major and very important part, but MDA also includes all maritime safety issues, including, but not limited to, *Aids to Navigation* (ATON) inspections, *Public Education* (PE), *Vessel Safety Checks* (VSCs), and the *Recreational Boating Safety Visitation Program* (RBSVP). Further, most Auxiliary programs and activities support both safety and security missions.

As the Coast Guard becomes more involved with maritime security matters, the Auxiliary will have to carry a heavier burden with maritime safety needs.

Safety

Traditionally, the Coast Guard has tasked the Auxiliary for assistance in the performance of its *Recreational Boating Safety* (RBS) mission. The Auxiliary has responded with several important programs.

Public education has long been an important component of the Coast Guard's Recreational Boating Safety (RBS) mission. In addition, the VSC program has wide acceptance in the boating community and provides the boater with a valued service. New partnerships with the *United States Power Squadrons*[®] (USPS) and several states have enabled us to increase the number of persons qualified to provide examinations and the number of VSCs administered. Add into this mix the new RBSVP and the Auxiliary is well prepared to provide safety measures and share critical information to the boating community. Likewise, America's Waterway Watch program³ allows these three traditional safety mission-oriented outreach activities to broaden their scope and make a significant contribution to U.S. maritime security.

Historically, the Auxiliary's operational support of the Coast Guard's safety mission has centered on safety patrols conducted by vessels or aircraft and with the assistance of the Coast Guard in harbor safety matters. Harbor safety issues are addressed in concert with the *Captains of the Ports* (COTP), where valuable assistance to the Active Duty side is provided. This is a growth opportunity for the Auxiliary and, with assistance provided to Coast Guard and other port authorities, will continue to expand.

³ For training and promotional materials on Waterway Watch (a subset of AWW), see <http://cgauexd.org/elib/aids/www.htm>. For information on AWW, see <http://americaswaterwaywatch.com>

Actual *Search and Rescue* (SAR) missions are conducted by surface vessels, with Auxiliary aircraft performing a vital function in spotting and reporting vessels and persons in distress and guiding surface vessels to the scene. In addition, Auxiliary surface vessels and aircraft perform a variety of tasks including reporting ATON and lighting discrepancies, environmental incidents/conditions, and hazards to boaters on the waterways.

As part of MDA, all RBS operations and programs must continue to expand and become more efficient. Course materials, handouts, and other material provided to the public need to be modified to include additional information on MDA.

Security

The Auxiliary has traditionally performed security missions, but it has been principally involved with patrols that establish safety zones at major events that border on waterways or marine events. Our security role post-9/11 is clearly different and evolving. As the Active Duty component of the Coast Guard devotes a great deal of its time and efforts to maritime homeland security missions, so must the Auxiliary.


During normal times (MARSEC 1)⁴ the Auxiliary will continue all safety missions. That is, the Auxiliary will continue to perform standard safety patrols, harbor patrols, infrastructure patrols, and SAR. When the threat level rises to MARSEC 2 or 3, the Auxiliary will marshal more of its resources, both personnel and equipment, to support Coast Guard efforts to counter the security threat.

Security issues are important and time is critical. Surge capabilities are necessary to provide adequate support necessary to quell the threat or react to an incident. These threats may be on a local or national level.

⁴ This refers to one of three U.S. Coast Guard *Maritime Security* (MARSEC) Levels. The Coast Guard has a three-tiered system of Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's *Homeland Security Advisory System* (HSAS). MARSEC Levels are designed to provide a means to easily communicate pre-planned scalable responses to increased threat levels. The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard sets MARSEC levels commensurate with the HSAS. Because of the unique nature of the maritime industry, the HSAS threat conditions and MARSEC levels will align closely, though they will not directly correlate. MARSEC levels are set to reflect the prevailing threat environment to the marine elements of the national transportation system, including ports, vessels, facilities, and critical assets and infrastructure located on or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. MARSEC Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate security measures shall be maintained at all times. MARSEC 1 generally applies when HSAS Threat Condition Green, Blue, or Yellow are set. MARSEC Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a transportation security incident. MARSEC 2 generally corresponds to HSAS Threat Condition Orange. MARSEC Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation security incident is probable, imminent, or has occurred, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target. MARSEC 3 generally corresponds to HSAS Threat Condition Red.

IV. AUXILIARY MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY STRATEGY

The following chart⁵ shows the Coast Guard's four safety and security efforts of Awareness, Prevention, Protection, and Response and helps to define what each Auxiliary operation and program supports.



Prior to 9/11, most of the Coast Guard's national homeland security efforts were focused on the far right side of the chart – protection and response. Little thought or effort was directed to awareness and prevention as the national mind-set was based on the belief that terrorism was something that would probably occur only outside of the homeland. The events of 9/11 dramatically altered that view, emphasizing the importance of awareness and prevention.

⁵ This was adapted from a chart prepared by Admiral Thomas H. Collins (USCG Commandant) for a talk entitled "Change and Continuity in The U.S. Coast Guard Today" available electronically at <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2004/Spring/art1-sp04.htm>.

Awareness

The act of *being aware on purpose* needs definition and specific planning. If the Auxiliary is to follow the Coast Guard's definition of Maritime Domain Awareness, it is broad enough to capture virtually anything that occurs on America's waterways.

Auxiliary aircraft, surface vessels, and land patrols generally operate in areas that are familiar to the crews. This local knowledge provides a baseline that facilitates detection of unusual events and situations. Auxiliary Air (AuxAir) patrols are currently conducting harbor and critical infrastructure overflights. The more than 300 AuxAir aircraft are attached to and directed by Coast Guard air stations.

Of particular note is that AuxAir has just completed a successful proof-of-concept test to determine the feasibility of using AuxAir to supplement other receiver sensors in interrogating *Automatic Identification System* (AIS) broadcasts. Every inbound ship to an American port must broadcast an information set. That information is captured and forwarded to the proper fusion center⁶ for integration into the overall coastal security picture. Various sensor platforms are used around the coasts, such as buoys, airships, aircraft, land reception stations, and ships at sea.

However, there are some gaps in the reception coverage. One such gap is on the southeastern seaboard. Operating out of Coast Guard Air Station Savannah, an AuxAir aircraft and crew have flown three highly successful missions. The mission results are now being reviewed by the Coast Guard to determine if this activity should be expanded to other areas.

Land patrols have not been a major part of Auxiliary patrol activity, being performed in only a few areas. The Auxiliary intends to rejuvenate and quickly increase both the number of qualified patrol members and the number and geographic scope of the patrols. There are many critical infrastructures that border on waterways that are better patrolled on foot, bicycle, or motor vehicle.

A new land patrol mission set is under development, which will see these two-member patrols reach the same level of importance and value as the air and surface patrols.

To provide the Coast Guard with unprecedented capacity for identifying unusual activity on and around America's waterways, a public outreach program – America's Waterway Watch – has been launched. The objective is to enlist America's 70 million recreational boaters to become the eyes and ears of the Coast Guard. Managed by the Auxiliary, this Coast Guard program has, as its near-term objective, contacting three million boaters no later than year-end 2006. Long-term plans call for the great majority of recreational boaters to be invited to participate. For more information see Appendix A.

⁶ In intelligence usage, this is a physical location where various sources of information are brought together. One definition of fusion is "the process of acquisition, filtering, correlation and integration of relevant information from various sources, such as sensors, databases, knowledge bases and humans, into one representational format that is appropriate for deriving decisions regarding the interpretation of the information..." (Sander, W. A., (1993). Information fusion. In Dupuy, T. N., et al., Eds, *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*, Vol. 3. Brassey's Inc.

Prevention

As with awareness, the prevention aspect of the Auxiliary Maritime Safety and Security Strategy is well suited for Auxiliary involvement. Indeed, awareness and prevention efforts go hand-in-hand. As an example, by just showing a uniformed, official presence, a patrol acts as a deterrent to potential terrorists. This presence effectively hardens that area or site. In addition, that same patrol is also performing the awareness function by being on the lookout for unusual activity, something that is out-of-the-ordinary. The reporting of an unusual situation triggers a protection response by the Coast Guard and/or other law enforcement agencies. Thus, multi-mission patrols with the inclusion of MDA elements are becoming standard.

When potential terrorists see local law enforcement and Coast Guard (both Active Duty and Auxiliary) patrolling a site or area by land, sea, and air, they are more likely to go elsewhere or, in the best case scenario, stop their activities altogether.

As a key element in MDA, the Coast Guard is prioritizing critical infrastructure facilities that, due to their relative importance, their damage or destruction presents the greatest threat to the nation. As this prioritizing progresses, and the results work their way through the Coast Guard chain-of-command, the Auxiliary can expect to be directed to more specific areas and sites for patrol activity than is the present case.

As with awareness, prevention efforts are deeply embedded in OPR III and can be reviewed in Appendix A.

Protection

Efforts to protect America's waterways and critical infrastructure fall largely outside of the Auxiliary's authorized missions. These efforts are appropriately provided by the Coast Guard's Active Duty and other military and law enforcement agencies that have the mandate, equipment, and training to take effective action.

That said, the Auxiliary does have a role in augmenting Coast Guard billets so that more of the Active Duty personnel can join the front line in protecting areas and sites. This Auxiliary effort is operation AUXPAL, a description of which may be found in Appendix A.

Response

Despite efforts to the contrary, it is possible that some terrorist initiatives will succeed and the Auxiliary must be capable of assisting other agencies by responding in a fast, efficient, and effective manner. America's disaster response activities have been quite successful, particularly with regard to natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, and flooding. The same disaster response infrastructure will, for the most part, serve well in responding to a successful terrorist attack.

The Department of Homeland Security accords high priority to the possibility of a successful *weapons of mass destruction* (WMD) attack. The Auxiliary may expect to play an ever-increasing role in disaster response as the nation ramps up this effort.

Nevertheless, the Auxiliary does currently provide the Coast Guard and other governmental units with direct disaster response assistance. The Auxiliary's communication program stands ready to respond in conjunction with other communication networks or act as a stand-alone network in cases where normal networks are disabled.

Many Auxiliarists routinely participate in disaster response exercises. There are currently six such exercises and they may be found on the MDA/OPR web site (<http://www.uscgaux.org/~opr/>).

MDA Implementation – OPR III

In April 2004, the Auxiliary launched *Operation Patriot Readiness III* (OPR III)⁷, a set of seven well-defined operations, the focus of which was to overwhelmingly put the Auxiliary on a clear awareness/prevention track and with a somewhat lesser presence in protection and response. Of all the issues surrounding MDA and the Coast Guard's Maritime Homeland Security mission, the Auxiliary is well suited to perform this awareness/prevention role.

The operations being used by the various Auxiliary directorates, departments, and districts to implement all four areas (awareness, prevention, protection, response) are contained in OPR III. These operations are:

1. District mapping
2. Standard operations
3. Surge operations
4. Readiness exercises
5. Recreational Boating Safety
6. *Maritime Transportation Security Act* (MTSA) support
7. *Auxiliary Personnel Augmentation List* (AUXPAL)

In the present state of OPR III, the Auxiliary districts are in the implementation process. (For a more complete update of OPR III, see Appendix A.)

⁷ For more details on OPR III see <http://www.uscgaux.org/~opr/> and in Appendix A.

V. SUMMARY

The assurance that Auxiliary missions in support of MDA have high priority and urgency is of great importance. Fighting terrorism will be a protracted activity. There may be long periods with no attack on and in the United States which, if not strongly addressed, can lead to complacency and lack of urgency.

Therefore, a plan must be established so the MDA concept becomes deeply imbedded in the Auxiliary at all levels. The parameters are:

- The Coast Guard has formulated an in-depth strategic Maritime Domain Awareness protocol.
- MDA encompasses both safety and security missions.
- All Coast Guard and Auxiliary missions fall into either, or both, safety or security efforts.
- The Coast Guard will continue to define and promulgate MDA.
- The Auxiliary, at the national level, will continue to work closely with the MDA Directorate to assure that the Auxiliary and the Directorate are in synch.
- The Auxiliary, at the national level, will continue to dialog with the MDA Directorate to scan for worthwhile Auxiliary missions in support of the MDA protocol.
- The POC between the MDA Directorate and the Auxiliary is the Auxiliary's National Director of Maritime Domain Awareness, who reports directly to NACO and has a strong direct link with the NADCOs.

To accomplish MDA recognition and integration, it is recommended, as a first step, that the present District OPR III Coordinators be renamed and refocused as MDA District Coordinators.

- This group should remain as "ad hoc", with individual districts having authority to make the position permanent as a DSO-MDA position, reporting to the *District Commodores* (DCOs).
- This effectively broadens their responsibility and authority and serves to forge a direct link to the National Director – MDA.

The Auxiliary's MDA District Coordinators and National Director will work together to accomplish the following actions:

1. Create an MDA training course usable at all Auxiliary levels.
2. Create an integrated MDA communications system for the membership and leadership.
3. Assure that DCOs have all the available applicable knowledge emanating from the Coast Guard MDA Directorate and the Auxiliary national bridge.
4. Assure that the MDA issues stemming from Auxiliary MDA field actions reach the Auxiliary national bridge and the Coast Guard MDA Directorate.
5. Recommend actions in support of district needs and assure that the Coast Guard's MDA tasking to the Auxiliary is completed effectively and that there is sufficient feedback to the Coast Guard as to both positive and negative aspects of the protocol.

APPENDIX A

OPERATION PATRIOT READINESS III (OPR III)

Operation 1 – District Mapping: Become aware and identify (with the Coast Guard) the critical maritime infrastructure within the local area of responsibility. In some areas, this information is held tightly for security reasons. However, the critical infrastructure components on the waterways, such as bridges, tunnels, cruise ship docks, oil refineries and storage areas, nuclear plants, are easily located and identified. These areas and sites should be mapped and made part of Auxiliary patrols so as to be able to identify the critical components to assess when on a safety/security patrol.

Thus, when MARSEC levels rise and the Coast Guard starts assigning missions the Auxiliary will know what to do, when to do it and who does it.

These patrols, and the planning for them, should not be limited to coastal waters. Indeed, the inland waters are highly vulnerable to terrorist actions. Moreover, the Coast Guard has a limited presence in these waters and will depend on the Auxiliary to play a large and important role.

Operations 2 and 3 – Standard and Surge Operations: The difference between standard and surge operations is that the Auxiliary during normal times (indicated by a MARSEC 1 threat level) conducts many multi-mission patrols combining both security (awareness) activities and traditional safety patrols, ATON inspections, and SAR operations.

As the MARSEC level (locally, regionally, or nationally) rises to level 2 or 3, Auxiliary patrol response changes both in number and type and, to a lesser extent, geographical areas of patrols. While on patrols, less activity is devoted to safety issues and more time is spent on security/awareness issues.

Surge operations also put a heavy burden on Auxiliary facilities and crews. Significant planning needs to be done to maximize crew effectiveness, assure a continuing and reliable schedule, prepare to work with other authorities (in addition to the Coast Guard), and be a mobile force.

Operation 4 – Readiness Exercises: Plans need to be created that include numerous air, sea, and land readiness exercises to hone skills and effectiveness. It is not productive to learn a procedure or skill under the stress of a heightened security level. The learning and practice need to be done in a non-emergency, low threat environment.

The focus during these exercises is one of awareness. Train on those tasks you will be expected to perform until actions become commonplace and automatic.

Operation 5 – Recreational Boating Safety: The role of the Auxiliary in the RBS area is long standing and respected by the Coast Guard and boating public. Auxiliary RBS activity is in four segments: Public Education, Vessel Safety Checks, RBS Visitation Program and America’s Waterway Watch.

Public Education (PE) – This activity supports both security and safety issues, as well as providing over 50% of the Auxiliary’s operating budget.

PE’s role in safety issues bear on preventive SAR. In teaching boating students how to safely manage their boats, crew and passengers, as well as how to cope with on-the-water issues, PE adds materially to safety on the waterways, thus, preventing situations that require search and rescue.

Auxiliary leadership has been proactive in the development of new courses and using advanced teaching methods and delivery structures. This thrust will continue and accelerate.

PE also has a direct impact on security issues since our classrooms provide an excellent opportunity to persuade students to participate in America’s Waterway Watch. (See below.)

Vessel Safety Checks (VSC) – This long standing Coast Guard program, managed by the Auxiliary, adds measurably to promoting safety on the waterways by providing free safety checks on recreational boats. Recent expansion of the program has seen other organizations, such as the United States Power Squadrons, join in providing VSCs. This expansion must, and will continue to provide this service to America’s 22 million recreational boats and an estimated 70 million boaters.

On the security side, the time spent inspecting the boat and talking with the owner/operator is ideal for explaining America’s Waterway Watch and convincing the boater to participate. It also lends itself to discussion of security issues that are particular to the individual’s location.

Recreational Boating Safety Visitation Program (RBSVP) – is a new effort to promote both safety and security issues to the boating public using those businesses and organizations that support the boating industry as conduits to reach the boater. Auxiliarists, and others authorized to participate, are trained in how to conduct conversations with marina operators, boat manufacturers, boating stores, and other establishments on the waterways.

These “promotional” visits address boating safety issues and, through America’s Waterway Watch, security issues.

America's Waterway Watch (AWW) – This public outreach-awareness program (pioneered by the Auxiliary and launched on Sept. 11, 2003) promotes awareness on the waterways. It attempts to enlist a great majority of the 70 million recreational boaters to participate as the eyes and ears of the Coast Guard on all of America's waterways. This Coast Guard program, managed by the Auxiliary, provides the tools and training to the recreational boating community necessary to reach the objective.

Of paramount importance is the enlisting of other organizations and businesses in getting the word out to boaters. Seventy million boaters represent a huge market that, if effectively approached, could become invaluable in spotting and reporting unusual activities on the waterways.

The near-term objective is to contact three million boaters no later than year-end 2006. Long-term plans call for the great majority of recreational boaters to be invited to participate.

The Coast Guard will also rely on the Auxiliary to assist in contacting the commercial boating community. This community consists of commercial fishermen, cargo carriers, and others who earn their living on the waterways. The outreach program perfectly ties into the new RBSV Program mentioned above.

A strategic marketing plan for America's Waterway Watch has been developed and is being executed.

Operation 6 – Maritime Transportation Security Act: The Auxiliary supports the inspection provisions of this act by onboard inspection of vessels that are required to obtain and publish Coast Guard security plans. Currently, the Western Rivers Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) has tasked the Auxiliary with onboard inspections of vessels in that 11-state area of responsibility, where there are approximately 325 Coast Guard Active Duty and Reserve personnel. They are stretched too thin to do the job alone. The Auxiliary has in excess of 6,000 members in the area and is a major force multiplier. As the Auxiliary expertise and capacity matures, this will occur in other parts of the country.

Operation 7 – Auxiliary Personnel Augmentation List (AUXPAL): Introduced one year ago as an expansion of a long standing Auxiliary program, AUXPAL is a well-defined and supported plan designed to accomplish two different Coast Guard support requirements. These are: 1) to provide trained Auxiliarists to relieve Coast Guard personnel from routine station duties so that they may be better utilized in operational roles and 2) to provide new members with specific talents and/or equipment to bolster Auxiliary ranks filling any personnel or facility gaps made evident in the District Mapping operation.

Using information captured in AUXDATA, the Coast Guard calls on Auxiliarists to perform a host of duties such as radio operator, engine mechanic, interpreter duties, medical backup or administrative functions. These Auxiliarists have completed Auxiliary training as well as Coast Guard training specific to their assignment. Where available, current Auxiliary members volunteer and are trained for these augmentations. Where there is not a sufficient number of local Auxiliary members for Coast Guard needs, the Auxiliary “target recruits” specifically qualified local citizens. These new members are then provided with the necessary Auxiliary and Coast Guard education and training and then become part of the augmentation program.

The education and training provided is done on an accelerated basis to accomplish all that is required within a relatively short time.

The final area where AUXPAL supports both the RBS and operational safety and security missions addresses internal Auxiliary needs for specific tasks. Target recruitment is designed to add members who already have skills needed by the Auxiliary, at all levels. Wherever the District Mapping operation shows a need for additional boats and aircraft with trained operators the Auxiliary goes into the civilian market place to augment present strength and, thus, fulfill the requirements of the Coast Guard.

Targeted recruitment is a relatively new endeavor for the Auxiliary and holds great promise to improve, expand, and make more effective Auxiliary personnel augmentation for both internal needs and those of the Coast Guard.

APPENDIX B: Excerpt from USCG White Paper on MDA

DIRECTOR, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS UNITED STATES COAST GUARD WASHINGTON, DC 20593-0001

30 June 2004

Letter of Promulgation

In late 2002, the Coast Guard published its “Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,” which established key objectives and means to achieve them to mitigate the risks associated with threats to our Nation’s maritime security and to prevent terrorist attacks. There are three primary components of this Strategy:

- Awareness of threats and vulnerabilities
- Prevention and Protection against threats
- Response to potential attacks

Among these elements the most important is Awareness, because the success of the other two elements clearly depends on the effectiveness of the first. The ability to know what is both normal and unusual in the maritime domain, and to provide actionable intelligence and coherent information to the decision makers and operators when they need it most and in a form that they can easily use, is crucial to our Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the name that has been applied to this crucial ability. The achievement of MDA will depend on how distinctly the concept is defined, how clearly it is understood, and how well it is implemented.

This White Paper is intended to help define, describe, and clarify the important concept of MDA, and provide an outline as to its future implementation. It is by no means intended to be final or definitive in its scope. Rather, this White Paper is a work in progress, intended to begin an important dialogue toward better understanding.

In the future, as we understand more clearly and in greater depth the requirements and resources necessary to achieve effective MDA, the contents of this White Paper will be adapted to reflect that greater understanding. Meanwhile, it will serve as the first step on a long, but necessary journey.

/s/ Jeffrey P. High

APPENDIX B: Excerpt from USCG White Paper on MDA

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS A National Capability for Maritime Security

Executive Summary

On 11 September 2001, the security of the United States was breached when terrorists attacked with brutal force inside the protection of our own borders. Our Nation lacked critical awareness of the imminent threat. Although the terrorists who attacked us used commercial aircraft as weapons, we must now anticipate that those who wish us harm will readily seek other methods and means of attack. They will attempt to strike where and when we least expect it, pitting their strengths against what they perceive to be weaknesses. Indeed, the oceans, waterways, and ports that have helped ensure the liberty and prosperity of the United States since colonial times are highly vulnerable to exploitation by those who would threaten our security and undermine our freedom.

To counter such threats and challenges effectively, we must know both what is “normal” and “not normal” throughout the U.S. Marine Transportation System and the Maritime Domain—from the inland waterways and ports to the high seas. **Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is defined as the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.** The end state that we must seek is to maintain a continuous, comprehensive, timely, current, and detailed knowledge of all vessels, events, conditions, and trends within the maritime domain, discreetly identifying any anomalies that may indicate a potential threat. Executed properly, MDA will be one of the means by which an effective balance between liberty and security can be accomplished. MDA has three primary goals, which are consistent with the strategic goals of the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and the *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security*:

- Discern between legitimate and illegitimate activities.
- Support threat-based risk management of valuable, but limited resources.
- Support all maritime security and safety operations of the United States.

Key national strategy and policy documents that address Maritime Security call for the implementation of an interagency architecture designed for more effective sharing of information and intelligence. This capability generally is referred to as “domain awareness.” In kind, Maritime Domain Awareness consists of a broad spectrum of crucial information-sharing activities. Intelligence is a central element, although it is only one among a multitude of information sources that contribute to comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain. Effective MDA in the United States will require unprecedented cooperation among the various elements of government or private industry that hold vital information, extending well beyond the capabilities of the Intelligence Community, *per se*.

The vulnerability of U.S. citizens and the infrastructure in the maritime domain is a challenge to both the public and the private sectors. Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as commercial industry and firms, non-governmental organizations, and citizens dealing with any element of maritime safety, security, commerce, defense, and environment in the maritime domain are all central to the effort of sharing information related to maritime security and to acting quickly and effectively on that information.

Effective understanding of the maritime domain involves specific knowledge of vessels, crews, cargoes, port infrastructures, transshipment facilities, maritime approaches, waterways, anchorages, fishing grounds, rookeries, choke-points, shipping lanes, and transit corridors, as well as a diverse array of critical infrastructure—from offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico to the Statue of Liberty. Obviously, this awareness must become increasingly comprehensive as potential threats approach closer to the U.S. coasts, ports, and inland waterways.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a central role in every effort to increase domain awareness throughout the nation. As the lead Federal agency for maritime homeland security, the United States Coast Guard has the primary responsibility within DHS to protect the U.S. maritime domain and the Marine Transportation System, denying their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population, and critical infrastructure. The U.S. Coast Guard also safeguards the homeland against a broad array of other maritime related threats—drug smuggling, illegal migration, organized crime, resource exploitation, danger to those conducting commerce and other legitimate maritime operations, the spread of infectious diseases, and environmental degradation. **Maritime Domain Awareness supports all Coast Guard missions, and all Coast Guard missions support security and safety.**

MDA is the critical enabler that will allow the U.S. Coast Guard and its partners to achieve their objectives against a vast array of threats confronting the United States, while sustaining the free flow of commerce and maintaining individual freedoms. **When it is fully developed and mature, MDA will support decision-making at three broad levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.** These levels involve a variety of players and widely differing perspectives of maritime homeland security, from very senior federal government leaders to people at the forefront of mission execution. Even though functional commonalties exist across and among all levels, specific responsibilities from top to bottom demand careful tailoring of content and detail of MDA products. The final measure of the products of Maritime Domain Awareness is whether the information requirements of decision-makers at every level are being satisfied sufficiently to time operations for maximum effectiveness.

Despite the technical, cultural, organizational, and operational challenges to its reaching full maturity and capability, MDA is the critical enabler that will allow the national strategies to succeed in their objectives of prevention, protection, response and recovery against the threats confronting the United States, while sustaining the free flow of commerce and maintaining our freedoms. MDA turns information, intelligence, and knowledge into the power needed to provide greater safety and security to American citizens and those that are inextricably linked to us by the sea.



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY CONTINUES TO PROMOTE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM AT WATERFRONT

April 28, 2008

For More Information Contact:
Anthony Turner, Chief
External Communications Division
National Department of Public Affairs
Email: anthony.turner@yahoo.com
(310) 908-6950

U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY CONTINUES TO PROMOTE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM AT WATERFRONT

Not long after September 11, 2001, America's Waterway Watch (AWW), a public outreach program, that encourages participants to simply report suspicious activity to the Coast Guard and/or other law enforcement agencies was born. Today, *America's Waterway Watch (AWW)*, a combined effort of the Coast Guard and its Reserve and Auxiliary components, continues to grow, enlisting the active participation of those who live, work or play around America's waterfront areas. Coast Guard Reserve personnel concentrate on connecting with businesses and government agencies, while Auxiliary Members of the Coast Guard focus on building AWW awareness among the recreational boating public and public stakeholders, such as marina's.

WHY DO WE NEED AMERICA'S WATERWAY WATCH? America's coasts, rivers, bridges, dams, tunnels, ports, ships, military bases, and waterside industries may be the terrorists' next targets. Though waterway security is better than ever, with more than 95000 miles of shoreline, over 290,000 square miles of water, and approximately 70 million recreational boaters in the United States, the Coast Guard and local first responders cannot do the job alone.

America's Waterway Watch is similar to the *Coast Watch* program of World War II, which caused the early growth of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, who were mobilized as a uniformed, civilian component of the Coast Guard to scan the coast for U-boats and saboteurs attempting to infiltrate the shores of the United States. Today, *America's Waterway Watch* goes one step further: It calls on ordinary citizens who spend much of their on and around America's waterways - to assist in the War on Terrorism on the Domestic Front.

In addition to its public outreach efforts the Coast Guard Auxiliary has also increased it public presence and outreach efforts in major marina's and ports, such as in southern California and the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach (see photo below)

For more information about the America's Waterway Watch program visit <http://www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/index.htm> If you are interested in assisting in a more formal capacity, either as a paid professional or trained volunteer, you should consider a civilian or military career with the United States Coast Guard (<http://www.gocoastguard.com/jobs.html>) or joining the Coast Guard Auxiliary (<http://www.cgaux.org/>).

The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary is the uniformed civilian component of the United States Coast Guard. Created by an Act of Congress in 1939, the Auxiliary directly supports the Coast Guard in all missions, except military and direct law enforcement actions. The Coast Guard Auxiliary is an integral part of the United States Coast Guard. For more information visit www.cgaux.org if you are ready to join visit <http://join.cgaux.org/>.

###

To subscribe please visit <mailto:news-l-subscribe@list.auxpa.org>
To unsubscribe please visit news-l-unsubscribe@list.auxpa.org



Pictured: As part of its increased presence in marinas Coast Guard Auxiliary Members George Assali (Left) and Tony Dallendorfer conduct an courtesy inspection of a Uninspected Passenger Vessel (UPV) in Dana Point, CA.)